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LABOR LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SEVENTH
CIRCUIT LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
DECISIONS, 1981-82 TERM
THOMAS J. PISKORSKI*
INTRODUCTION
The most significant recent development in the Seventh Circuit in
the area of labor relations is really a lack of development. In a series of
cases, the court unsuccessfully attempted to announce a standard to be
applied in testing whether a union has breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation for purposes of suits brought under § 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act (LMRA). This article will primarily focus on a
review of these cases as well as the doctrine itself, analyzing its devel-
opment in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The past term (June 1, 1981 to May 31, 1982) also offered some of
the more factually interesting labor law decisions in recent years.
Rather than selecting and concentrating on several areas, a comprehen-
sive review of many labor law decisions will be provided with the hope
that practitioners will find the summarization and commentary valua-
ble as a timely source of Seventh Circuit authority.
Prior Seventh Circuit Reviews have not for the most part discussed
developments in areas of labor relations such as Age Discrimination
and Title VII actions. The rapid growth and major importance of these
types of cases require discussion for this Review to satisfy its basic
function of comprehensively summarizing recent circuit developments
in the entire field of management-employee relations. While relatively
brief and selective, the discussions do highlight key and interesting
holdings which will be useful to all employment law practitioners.
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION: ABSENCE OF A SINGLE,
MEANINGFUL AND WORKABLE STANDARD
Background
As the recognized exclusive bargaining representative for all unit
* Member, Illinois Bar. B.S. 1977, Marquette University; M.B.A. 1981, J.D. 1981, Univer-
sity of Notre Dame.
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employees, I the union is endowed with enormous power over the rights
and benefits those employees receive in the working place. 2 The doc-
trine of the duty of fair representation has evolved as a check against
this potentially abusable power and to protect minority and individual
interests.3 It imposes an enforceable duty upon the union to fairly and
nondiscriminatorily represent all employees in the relevant bargaining
unit-members and nonmembers alike-in all phases of its statutory
and contractual responsibilities, ranging from the negotiation of a col-
lective bargaining agreement to the processing of an individual em-
ployee's grievance.
But the significance of the fair representation doctrine extends be-
yond the employee-union relationship. In suits brought by an em-
ployee against his employer under § 301 (a) of the LMRA,4 for a breach
of the collective bargaining agreement, the employee must prove that
the union breached its duty of fair representation in the handling of the
grievance. Absent such a showing, the court may not entertain the
breach of contract action. For practical purposes, it is in the context of
§ 301 suits that the duty is most significant.
Defining the nature and scope of the fair representation duty has
proved to be a formidable task for the courts as well as the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) because of the breadth of management-
employee relations implicated. Determining whether a union's conduct
amounts to "unfair representation" varies with the nature of the
union's actions and the respective interests which are present. While
courts have made every effort to do so, they have been unsuccessful in
setting forth a single, workable standard that provides guidance to un-
ions and employers alike in determining what is "unfair representa-
1. Section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), establishes the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for unit employees. It provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclu-
sive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment ...
2. The individual freedom of contract is lost under the Act. An employer is prohibited from
bypassing or disregarding the exclusive bargaining representative by negotiating directly with in-
dividual employees. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); J.1. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 5-14.
4. Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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tion." Instead, only vague, generalized standards have been
announced which provide little meaningful guidance or assistance in
defining the duty's contours. The lack of specific standards has gener-
ated serious problems. The most disconcerting is the marked and
steady increase in the number of § 301 suits brought by disgruntled and
dissatisfied employees in state and federal courts. As greater numbers
of employees turn to the courts to resolve workplace disputes, grievance
procedures contained in collective bargaining agreements assume less
importance. As a result, the fundamental objective of federal labor
laws-the private resolution of labor disputes-is seriously threatened.
The duty of fair representation must, therefore, balance the inter-
est of an aggrieved employee who seeks redress for the alleged wrongs
inflicted upon him against the interest of all parties in resolving labor
disputes outside the judicial forum by agreed upon procedures. This
statement represents sound theory but offers scant practical guidance in
determining whether a union has breached its duty. Indeed, the single
most important problem underlying the fair representation doctrine is
the courts' failure to transform theory into definitive standards.
Supreme Court Developments
In 1967, the Supreme Court rendered a decision which remains the
benchmark of all fair representation analysis. In Vaca v. Sipes,5 a dis-
charged employee brought suit alleging a breach by the union of its fair
representation duty by refusing to submit his grievance to arbitration.
Justice White announced the standard which continues to govern
today:
A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only
when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargain-
ing unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.6
With respect to the processing of a grievance, Justice White declared:
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion,
we do not agree that the individual employee had an absolute right
to have his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions
of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. 7
In refusing to create an absolute right to have a grievance submit-
ted to arbitration, the majority reasoned that the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the grievance procedure would be seriously impaired and
5. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
6. Id at 190.
7. Id at 191.
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undermined if a union were not allowed to exercise its good faith and
reasoned judgment regarding the overall merits and interests of a griev-
ance. The union must be able to exercise selectivity in the processing of
grievances for the collective bargaining process to flourish. Justice
White did, however, add the following limitation on the union's exer-
cise of selectivity:
In administering the grievance and arbitration machinery as statu-
tory agent of the employees, a union must, in good faith and in a
nonarbitra 2 manner, make decisions as to the merits of particular
grievances.,
Albeit slightly more complicated, an employee discharge was also
the subject of the Court's next major fair representation decision in Mo-
tor Coach Employees v. Lockridge.9 The case was decided on preemp-
tion grounds but, in significant dicta, Justice Harlan provided insight
into the Court's view of fair representation. Under the facts of the case,
the employee was discharged after the union unintentionally erred in
representing to the employer that the employee was in sufficient arrears
with respect to union dues to warrant discharge under the collective
bargaining agreement. The employee proceeded only against the
union under the fair representation doctrine. The standard applied by
Justice Harlan was drawn from Vaca and the earlier case of Humphrey
v. Moore 0 :
For [a breach of the duty of fair representation] claim to be made
out, [the employee] must have proved "arbitrary or bad-faith con-
duct on the part of the Union." [cite omitted]. There must be "sub-
stantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct."
[cite omitted]. I I
He added the following important analysis:
And the fact that the doctrine was originally developed and applied
by courts, after passage of the Act, and carries with it the need to ad-
duce substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe,
and unrelated to legitimate union objectives ensures that the risk of con-
flict with the general congressional policy favoring expert, centralized
administration, and remedial action is tolerably slight. . . . If, how-
ever, the congressional policies Garmon seeks to promote are not to
be swallowed up, the very distinction, embedded within the instant
lawsuit itself, between honest, mistaken conduct on the one hand, and
deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment, on the other,
8. Id at 194. Specific application of this standard, or lack thereof, can be found in Hoffman
v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981) and Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1978).
9. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
10. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
II. 403 U.S. at 299.
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needs strictly to be maintained.' 2
The language in the above quoted passage suggests a much more
stringent standard than set forth in either Vaca or Humphrey. It is a
heavy burden for an employee to overcome to show "intentional or
severe" or "deliberate and severely hostile and irrational" treatment by
the union in order to proceed with his § 301 action. An observer can
only conclude that the Court's position on the fair representation stan-
dard is quite clear; the standard is an exceptionally high and enor-
mously difficult one to satisfy.
The last major Supreme Court decision examining the fair repre-
sentation duty is Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight.13 A discharged em-
ployee brought suit alleging that the union failed to adequately
investigate the truth of the employer's charges. Interestingly, the Court
failed to even cite Lockridge, its most recent pronouncement on the fair
representation duty. Instead, it reaffirmed the standard enunciated in
Vaca with respect to the processing and administration of grievances.' 4
The question which is raised is whether Hines represents an implied
reversal of the "fraud and deceit" language found in Lockridge and
Humphrey. Furthermore, under the "arbitrary" standard in Vaca,
must an employee establish intentional wrongful conduct by the union
in order to proceed with a § 301 suit or is negligence sufficient? Where
is the meaningful line to be drawn between mere laxity in performance
and redressable unfair representation? These and other issues sur-
rounding the fair representation duty have been the subjects of consid-
erable analysis by the Seventh Circuit.
Past Seventh Circuit Developments
It was not until 1975, some eight years after Vaca, when the Sev-
enth Circuit first critically analyzed the fair representation doctrine in
Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. Is A discharged employee
alleged in a § 301 suit that the union had breached its duty by failing to
raise a defense during the grievance procedure. Decided before Hines,
the court was required to apply the strict standard of Lockridge: "[Tihe
plaintiff must show that the union's conduct was intentional, invidious
and directed at that particular employee."1 6 Characterizing the union's
failure to raise the defense as "an act of neglect or the product of a
12. Id at 301 (emphasis supplied).
13. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
14. Id at 568-69.
15. 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975).
16. Id at 293.
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mistake in judgment,"' 17 the court held there was no breach. Quoting
from a Third Circuit decision, it then importantly concluded that
"proof that the union may have acted negligently or exercised poor
judgment is not enough to support a claim of unfair representation."' 8
Three years later, in Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 19 the court clar-
fled the standard to be applied.20 In that case, the union had failed to
perform a ministerial duty with respect to the processing of a dis-
charged employee's grievance while telling the employee the act had
been performed. The district court awarded summary judgment in
favor of both the union and company. After affirming the judgment in
favor of the union on exhaustion of intraunion remedy grounds, the
Seventh Circuit reversed in regard to the company, reasoning that the
union may have possessed no legitimate reason for failing to process
the grievance. Consequently, summary judgment was inappropriate in
the absence of a record explaining why the union had acted as it did.
More importantly, the court went on to state that "Vaca expressly re-
jected an argument that only obvious breaches such as discrimination
or hostile treatment would be actionable."' 2' Then, squarely meeting
the conflict between Lockridge and Hines, the court stated in the ac-
companying footnote:
Occasional sentences lifted from their context might make it seem
that invidious hostility or some sort of malice is always required, see,
e.g., Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge . . . but the treatment of
the issue in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra, leaves little
doubt that such has not become the law. Nor do we think a fair
reading of Lockridge . . . really supports its arguments. 22
Baldini thus established the principle that the proper analysis for fair
representation cases is under Vaca and Hines. Something less than in-
tentional wrongful conduct but more than simple negligence is
required.
The conclusion of the Baldini court was reaffirmed in Miller v.
17. Id at 294.
18. Id, quoting Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970). Other
circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 668 F.2d 1204
(I Ith Cir. 1982); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981); Findley v. Jones
Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1981); Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888
(4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1980);
Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978); Coe v. United Rubber
Workers, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978).
19. 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1878).
20. In two interim cases, the court applied different Supreme Court decisions as controlling
authority. See Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Hines); Dwyer
v. Climatrol, 544 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977) (applying Lockridge).
21. 581 F.2d at 150 (footnote omitted).
22. Id at 150 n.5.
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Gateway Transportation Co. 23 A suspended employee alleged there
that the union did not properly represent him during the grievance pro-
cess. The court made quite clear that Lockridge was nothing more than
an unnecessary aberration in the Supreme Court's treatment of the fair
representation doctrine. It rejected the Lockridge standard and reaf-
firmed the principle that intentional union misconduct is not required.
One of the important aspects of Miller, in addition to its rejection
of an intent standard, is that it reaffirmed the fundamental maxim that
the specific elements of the duty vary with the nature of the union and
employee's interests. 24 Where a discharge is involved, the union's par-
ticipation assumes "special importance" because of the seriousness of
the interests at stake. Therefore, where the interests at stake are of
lesser importance, such as a suspension or reprimand, the union will
not be held to that same high level and quality of conduct. A "sliding
scale" is in effect created which must be applied to the specific facts
before the court.
Recent Seventh Circuit Developments-1981-82
In Baker v. Amsted Industries, Inc. ,25 several disgruntled em-
ployees filed a § 301 suit alleging that their union breached its fair rep-
resentation duty by electing not to pursue to arbitration, and instead
filing action in federal court, a dispute concerning the pension obliga-
tions of their employer and the purchaser of the employer's operations.
In his opinion for the court, Judge Cudahy reviews the fair representa-
tion duty from a theoretical basis in support of the court's decision that
the union had not acted improperly.
The significance of the opinion is that it explicitly acknowledges
"the difficulty of stating a single rule that will provide an appropriate
standard of decision in every case." 26 Judge Cudahy explains that the
proper analysis will involve the consideration of "each claim in light of
the interests it implicates .... -27 Much of the opinion, therefore, is
23. 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980).
24. Id at 277, and n.ll.
25. 656 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2011 (1982).
26. 656 F.2d at 1252.
27. Id Judge Cudahy then explained:
Thus, in deciding whether and to what extent a particular grievance should be pursued,
the Union must be allowed the discretion to balance many considerations and interests,
including the effect of various resolutions of the grievance on other employees, the re-qUirements of group organization and coherence, the desire for consistent treatment of
smlar claims, the appropriate allocation of limited resources for pursuing both individ-
ual and group claims, the maintenance of the Union's bargaining power and the neces-
sity of maintaining an effective continuing relationship with the employer.
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devoted to identifying the "diverse and divergent"28 policy interests be-
hind the duty of fair representation and its necessary role in collective
bargaining under federal labor laws.
Three interests were highlighted. The first is that the collective
interests of employees necessarily take precedence over the interest of
the individual employee. A second is that "the fair representation doc-
trine must be limited to avoid inappropriate interference with the
[Board's] exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. ' 29 The
court did not elaborate on this factor, citing instead language from
Vaca and Lockridge.30 The third policy interest concerns the employer
and the ability of a § 301 suit to reopen or reactivate an otherwise final
and binding arbitration award. The court stated: "The integrity of
such private settlement procedures, which are central to our system of
industrial relations, might be undermined if the fair representation doc-
trine is too broadly or freely applied .... ,31
The court encountered little difficulty in applying and balancing
these policy interests to the case before it and concluding that no
breach took place. The critical factor for the court was that the union
was acting in its capacity as representative of all members of the bar-
gaining unit.32 The interests of all employees were implicated and the
union was exercising its good faith and best reasoned judgment how to
protect those interests. It was a question of strategy. Against whom
should the claim be pursued and in which forum, arbitration or federal
court? The union selected the latter and as the court concluded,
"[e]ven if the Union's litigation strategy were subsequently determined
to be misconceived, it would be excessively intrusive into Union deci-
sion-making for the courts to decide, in the absence of bad faith or
egregious conduct, whether the Union has pursued the tactics most ap-
propriate to the aggrieved employees' needs. '33
The factual circumstances in Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. ,34 were more
familiar than those in Baker. In Hoffman, the union "forgot" to give
the written appeal required under the collective bargaining agreement
with respect to a discharged employee's grievance. The issue was
Id at 1250.
28. Id at 1249.
29. Id at 1250.
30. Id at n.10.
31. Id at 1251.
32. "[T]he decision challenged in this case obviously implicates substantial interests of the
Union in its capacity as representative of the entire bargaining unit." Id at 1252.
33. Id
34. 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
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whether this "negligent" conduct constituted a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation. The court, in a majority opinion by Judge
John Peck of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by special designation, held that
it did not.
The employee argued that the union was at least required to evalu-
ate his claim before deciding to abandon it.35 A strikingly similar fac-
tual situation existed in a decision from the Sixth Circuit in Ruzicka v.
General Motors Corp. ,36 wherein that court held simple negligence to
not be enough. Judge Peck interpreted Ruzicka as requiring conduct
"intended to harm" the employee or conduct reflecting a "reckless dis-
regard for the rights of the individual employee." 37 He also believed
that none of the reasoning or language in Miller and Baldini, despite
footnote 5 in Baldini, indicated that the Seventh Circuit viewed Vaca's
"arbitrary" standard as anything less than intentional wrongdoing.
Additional support for the new standard was found in Lockridge.
In addition to his interpretation of judicial authority, Judge Peck
relied upon two policy reasons. First, he believed that an intent re-
quirement was necessary to protect the employer's interest in the final-
ity of the grievance procedure. More specifically, the manipulatibility
of the suit and the lack of incentive for the union to vigorously contest
its alleged misconduct were ever present dangers under a lesser stan-
dard. 38 Secondly, he was concerned with the need to "limit the situa-
tions in which an employee may judicially contest the results of
grievance and arbitration proceedings that are the subject of collective
bargaining and properly within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board rather than the jurisdiction of the courts." 39 Based
35. See supra text accompanying note 8.
36. 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981). In Ruzicka, the union official also negligently failed to
timely file a grievance statement. The court held that such conduct did not amount to "arbitrari-
ness" because the union's action was due to its reliance on the employer's prevailing practice of
freely granting extensions of time. As Judge Cudahy notes in his concurring opinion in Hoffman,
had the union not relied upon that past practice, it is likely that a breach of the fair representation
duty would have been found. 658 F.2d at 525 n.5 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
37. 658 F.2d at 521, citing Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981).
38. Judge Peck reasoned as follows:
At least insofar as an employee seeks reinstatement and back pay, the union defendant
of a suit for "unfair representation" may have little reason to vigorously contest the issue
of alleged union wrongdoing. To permit an employee to recover because his union "for-
got" to follow required grievance procedures would create an unacceptably high risk of
collusion between union and employee, both of whom may share the same ultimate goal
of reinstatement of the employee. By permitting actions for failure to fairly represent
only where the employee can show intentional, invidious misconduct by the union, the
possibility of collusive suits is minimized.
Id at 522.
39. Id The same policy consideration was highlighted by Judge Cudahy in Baker. See
supra text accompanying note 29.
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upon these considerations, Judge Peck, joined by Judge Bauer, con-
cluded that an action for failure to fairly represent cannot be based
solely on an allegation that a union unintentionally failed to file a no-
tice that would permit a grievance to proceed to arbitration.
While agreeing that the union's conduct did not amount to a
breach of its duty, Judge Cudahy, in a concurring opinion,40 strongly
disagreed with Judge Peck's adoption of an intent standard and dis-
puted his interpretation of Lockridge, Baldini and Miller. Judge
Cudahy's position is that the "arbitrary" standard is not limited solely
to intentional conduct and that an intent standard effectively renders
meaningless the inclusion of "arbitrary" by the Supreme Court in
Vaca. He agrees that negligence is not enough but contends that some-
thing less than intent is; he adopts an "egregiousness" standard which
would focus upon whether the union's conduct was "within the range
of acceptable performance by a collective-bargaining agent."' 4' In his
view, such a standard best protects "the employer's interest in being
able to rely on the finality of the grievance procedure. '42
One of the significant aspects of Hoffman is Judges Peck and
Cudahy's strong disagreement on controlling Supreme Court authority.
Judge Cudahy charged that the majority's reliance on Lockridge was
misplaced and that Hines established that arbitrary conduct need not
be equated with intentional conduct.43  Judge Peck strongly dis-
agreed. 44 The relationship and conflict between Hines and Lockridge,
seemingly resolved in Miller and Baldini, is now revived. 45
The sharp division of the panel in Hoffman presented serious
problems for the court in two subsequent decisions. In Rupe v. Spector
Freight Systems, Inc. 46 a complicated set of facts revolved around the
employment status of an employee and whether the employer could
discharge him without cause under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The union interpreted the contract as giving the employer that
40. Id. at 523-25 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 524-25 n.4, (in which the court approved of and quoted from the concurring opin-
ion of Judge Kennedy in Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978)).
42. 658 F.2d at 525.
43. Id at 523-24.
44. Id at 522 n.2.
45. Hoffman was Judge Cudahy's first opinion on the duty of fair representation since Baker
was decided just ten days earlier, a decision he authored. It is interesting to examine his incorpo-
ration of Baker's principles into Hoffman inasmuch as their factual circumstances differ quite
markedly. In Baker, Judge Cudahy stressed that each case will have to be examined individually
and the laying down of hard rules will be extremely difficult. With the adoption of an intent
standard, Judge Peck may have removed a significant portion of that difficulty, at least with re-
spect to the processing of grievances.
46. 679 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1982).
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right. The important aspect of the opinion in Rupe is the manner in
which the court, speaking only through Judge Eschbach, avoids the in-
tentional misconduct standard of Hoffman. Stating that the court need
not decide whether a gross lack of diligence would violate the fair rep-
resentation duty, he impliedly approves of the "egregiousness" stan-
dard favorably discussed by Judge Cudahy in his concurring opinion in
Hoffman .47 The complete avoidance of the Hoffman standard, a point
well brought out by Judge Peck, again sitting by special designation, 48
is an astonishing example of judicial disregard of recent precedent.
The confusion left by Rupe was not resolved in the final fair repre-
sentation case decided just eleven days later. In Cote v. Eagle Store,
Inc. ,49 an employee was discharged for allegedly stealing two cartons
of cigarettes. Heeding its counsel's advice, the union decided not to
pursue the grievance to arbitration. In her § 301 suit, the employee
charged that the union failed to diligently represent her by failing to
personally interview her or to conduct an independent investigation
into the incident which triggered the discharge.
The court's analysis of the applicable legal standards raises further
questions concerning the prevailing law in this circuit. The court be-
gins by citing Hoffman as the "circuit's most recent statement on what
constitutes breach of the duty of fair representation. ' 50 This statement
is simply incorrect. The misstatement can, however, be explained by
the fact that Rupe was such a recent decision. It is likely that Cote was
circulated and approved prior to Rupe being decided. Nonetheless, un-
like Rupe, Cote expressly acknowledges the Hoffman standard that a
union commits a breach only if it acts in a "deliberate and severely
hostile irrational" manner.51 It is interesting to speculate how two
cases, decided within a period of less than two weeks, could reach op-
posite conclusions about what a case articulated as the governing legal
standard. Moreover, the Cote court approvingly quoted, as did Judge
Peck in Hoffman, the stringent standard announced in Lockridge.
Having applied the Hoffman standard and concluding that the
47. Id at 691-92.
48. Judge Peck responded with the following:
Consequently, I am of the view that the majority's statement that "we need not decide
whether a gross lack of diligence, without more, would violate the duty of fair represen-
tation," is inappropriate. That question has already been answered, and, I find it unnec-
essary to consider whether Rupe presented evidence of gross negligence by the union in
handling his grievance.
Id at 696 (Peck, J., concurring).
49. 688 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1982).
50. Id at 34.
51. Id
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union's conduct fell short of that level of conduct, the court seemingly
leaves no doubt that Hoffman is controlling. But in its final paragraph
the court states:
The Baldini standard is less stringent than the Hoffman stan-
dard. Therefore, having found no breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation under the Baldini test, there can be no breach under
Hoffman. The district court was correct in finding that the evidence
failed to establish any breach of the duty of fair representation. 52
The obvious purpose of this paragraph was to make clear to the em-
ployee that her case lacked merit even if the less stringent Baldini stan-
dard were applied rather than Hoffman. However, in light of the
confusion generated by Rupe, the paragraph does nothing but fuel ad-
ditional confusion and raise further questions concerning the circuit's
adherence to the Hoffman standard.
Despite four efforts to articulate a single standard governing the
duty of fair representation, the court failed to provide any clearer un-
derstanding into an already murky area of federal labor law. A legiti-
mate question which must be asked is what standard governs? Baker
concludes that no single standard can be appropriately applied to all
cases. In the very next case, however, Judge Peck concludes in Hoff-
man that an intentional misconduct standard governs. Then, in Rupe,
Judge Eschbach seemingly retreats from the Hoffman standard. And in
Cole, Hoffman is reaffirmed but with a slight injection of Baldini.
These four decisions give a new meaning to the doctrine of stare decisis.
What becomes painfully clear is that the court, as a unified voice,
must resolve the confusion surrounding the duty of fair representa-
tion.53 A single and workable standard, if possible, needs to be an-
nounced which will provide desperately needed practical guidance to
trial judges and practitioners alike.
The remainder of this article will review the balance of the past
term's decisions. The opinions can be generally divided into those
52. Id at 35.
53. The following law review articles provide thoughtful analysis of the fair representation
doctrine: Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations
and Grievance Handling, U. ILL. L.F. 35 (1979); Morgan, Fair is Foul and Foul is Fair-Ruzicka &
the Duty of Fair Representation in the Circuit Courts, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 335 (1980); Tobias,
Individual Employee Suitsfor Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation, 5 U. ToL. L. REv. 515 (1974); Note, The Duty of Fair Representation in Grievance Admin-
istration: A Specoc Test Modeled on Judge Bazelon s Dissent in United States v. DeCoster, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185 (1982); Note, Determining Standards/or a Union's Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation: The Casefor Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1980); Comment, Em-
ployee Challenges to ArbitralA wards.- A Modelfor Protecting Individual Rights Under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1310 (1977). See also articles cited in A. Cox, D. BOK
& R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw-CASES AND MATERALS, 994 n. I (9th ed. 1981).
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dealing with labor law and those dealing with employment law. Fur-
ther groupings will be made within these general divisions for the con-
venience of the reader.
REVIEW OF 1981-82 TERM LABOR LAW DECISIONS 54
Employer Communications
What an employer may or may not say to its employees during an
organizational campaign is a frequent subject in practically every term
of the court and 1981-82 is no exception. Several of the decisions are
worthy of discussion.
Perhaps the most analytically interesting case is NLRB v. Coca-
54. In Justak Bros. & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074 (7th Cir. 1981) and NLRB v. Berger
Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982), the court implicitly reaffirmed its decision in
Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1981), approving the Board's "dual motive" test
announced in Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1612 (1982). See also NLRB v. Town & Country LP Gas Serv. Co., 687 F.2d
187 (7th Cir. 1982). Recently, however, in NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733 (7th Cir.
1982), the court reversed itself and rejected Wright Line, instead adopting the Third Circuit's
allocation of proof set forth in NLRB v. Behring Int'l, Inc., 675 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1982). The
current conflict among the circuits, see Zurn Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 687-88 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1982), will be resolved by the Supreme Court which has granted certiorari in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1982) cert granted, 103 S. Ct. 372
(1982). A similar issue will be addressed by the Court in the context of public employees and their
exercise of first amendment rights. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La. 1981), aff'd
without opinion, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1629 (1982).
Other labor decisions decided this past term but not discussed in the text are the following:
Advertiser's Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1982) (union official's statement that if "at
any time" the employees become dissatisfied with the union, they could "vote it out just like they
voted it in" not a misrepresentation. But see Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 24
(1982), wherein the Board held that misleading campaign statements regarding Board actions will
no longer be grounds for setting aside representation election results); NLRB v. Berger Transfer &
Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982) ("warehouse foreman" not a supervisor); NLRB v. Gold
Standard Enter., Inc., 679 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1982) (broad variety of violations too numerous to
mention); Atlas Metal Parts Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981) (employer did not bargain
in bad faith by refusing to compromise on 2 of 36 proposals; employer under no obligation to
furnish information on its subcontracting activities); NLRB v. Colony Printing & Labeling, Inc.,
651 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1981) (letter sent by employer to employees violative of§ 8(a)(l)); NLRB v.
Rich's Precision Foundry, Inc., 667 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1981) (employer's statement that he
"couldn't afford to have a union in the place and pay discrimination wages; if he did, he'd have to
close the doors" violative of NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1242 (7th Cit. 1981) (employer engaged in bad faith bargaining by
entering negotiations with an irreversible decision; discharge of two union officials valid under
Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979); Southern Ind. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1981) (discussion of "supervisory employee" standards);
Justak Bros. & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); North Suburban Blood Center
v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1981) (standard for determining whether blood bank center a
"health care institution" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 152(14)); NLRB v. Keystone Steel &
Wire, 653 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981) (Board's remedial order conformed with mandate of court;
relief can place employees in a better position than they would have been in had employer not
committed the unfair labor practice).
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Cola Company Foods Division: 5 the first labor decision authored by
Judge Posner. The issue was what the court considered one of "first
impression" regarding the power of the Board to prohibit interference
with concerted activities before they materialize. The facts in the case
are relatively simple. A demoted employee's grievance was denied by
the plant manager. The employee then wrote a letter to the manager's
superior which included some personal attacks against the manager in
addition to the grievance. The manager learned of the letter and told
the employee that "if any talk gets around out there on that floor about
this grievance and what it pertains and this meeting, I'm coming after
you."' 56 The ALJ interpreted this remark as forbidding the employee
from discussing his grievance with his fellow workers and as threaten-
ing retaliation if the employee did so. The NLRB affirmed, adding that
the manager's statement restrained and coerced the employee in his
right to discuss his grievance with other employees for the purpose of
seeking their aid and support. 7 The court granted enforcement.
One of the fundamental rights possessed by employees under § 7
of the Act is the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of mutual aid and/or protection. 8 If the employee intended to enlist
other workers in support of his grievance, he would have been engaged
in a concerted activity protected by § 7.59 There was no way to deter-
mine, however, whether the employee intended to do that because the
manager's statement prevented anyone from answering that question.
But the court held that "[a] right can be denied before its exercise is
attempted or even contemplated. ' 60 Otherwise, outrageously unlawful
employer conduct, occurring at the inception of organizational activity,
would go unpunished "because no one could prove that concerted ac-
tivity protected by section 7 would ever have taken place in the absence
of the threat."'6'
In W. W Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 62 the issue was whether the
Board's finding that the employer had engaged in a coercive interroga-
tion of an employee was supported by substantial evidence. The court
55. 670 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1982).
56. Id at 85.
57. Id The Board at first affirmed the ALJ's decision without any opinion. Only later did it
make the addition which, as will be seen, became crucial to the final outcome of the case.
58. Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), provides in relevant part that "[eimployees
shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection. .. "
59. See Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1980).
60. 670 F.2d at 86.
61. Id
62. 677 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1982).
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held that it was not but the importance of the decision lies with Judge
Posner's analysis of the timing and circumstances under which an em-
ployer is required to tell an employee, at the outset of the questioning,
the purpose of it and assure him that there will be no reprisals if he
refuses to cooperate. 63 He stated that "[tihe time for the warnings is
when the witness has indicated a disposition to cooperate or at least
before he has ruled out cooperation." 64 If the employee refuses to co-
operate, no warnings need to be given. The court was less helpful with
respect to the circumstances which require the warnings be given. It
acknowledged that "[t]here are cases where the . . . warnings make
sense and others where they do not,"'65 but summarily concluded that
the failure to give the warnings in this case was not coercive. No prac-
tical assistance was given in identifying the circumstances where the
warnings "make sense."
In NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. ,66 the court applied the
Weingarten rule which permits employees to be assisted by a union
representative of their choice during investigative interviews.67 Two
telephone operators were under suspicion for adjusting charges on
calls. At the time of her interview, the employee requested that a union
representative be present but none was available. She then requested
that a former assistant union steward be permitted to assist her. Upon
learning that she was not a current steward, the employer refused. The
interview then proceeded with the employee ultimately admitting
wrongdoing.
The court agreed with the Board that the employee had not
waived her Weingarten rights because she was never informed that she
63. These warnings, the labor law counterpart of Miranda warnings, are referred to as the
"Johnnie's Poultry" warnings, named after the Board's decision in Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 770 (1964), en/'t denied on other grounds, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965). They are
designed to curb the inherent coercive impact of employer interrogation while at the same time
allowing the employer access to needed information in advance of the hearing. See also A & R
Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1979).
64. 677 F.2d at 560.
65. Id
66. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
67. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In two recent decisions, the Board has
extended the scope of Weingarten. See Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1982)(Weingarten applies to unrepresented workers as well as to workers represented by a union); Pa-
cific Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1982) (right to the presence of an advisor includes the
right to be informed in advance of the subject matter of the interview). But see Northwest Eng'g
Co., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (1982) (Weingarten inapplicable to plantwide rules meeting). For recent
analysis of the Weingarten rule, see Dobranski, The Rights of Union Representation in Employer
Interviews: A Post- Weingarten Analysis, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 295 (1982) and Margolin, Employee
Right to Representation in Employer Interviews: Weingarten and Progeny, 12 SETON HALL L. REV.
226 (1982).
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could terminate or suspend the interview until a union representative
could be present. There was also no evidence that the collective bar-
gaining agreement contained any limitation upon the employee's free-
dom of choice in the selection of a representative. For these reasons,
the court found the finding of no waiver well supported by the record.
No Distribution/No Solicitation Rules
While § 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in section 7," it has never been so broadly
interpreted as to bar the employer from imposing reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions on union distribution and solicitation ac-
tivities. The union's need to communicate with and reach employees
must be balanced with the employer's need to maintain security, pro-
tect property and ensure efficient operations.68 Shop rules addressing
union solicitation and distribution are the most common means utilized
by employers to advance and protect these interests. The scope of such
rules was addressed in two decisions.
In NLRB v. Rich's Precision Foundry, Inc. ,69 the employer's shop
rule subjected employees to discipline for "distribution of any literature
of [sic] soliciting or selling of any kind during working hours. ' 70 The
Board concluded that the rule infringed on the employees' right to en-
gage in union solicitation and distribution on their breaks and lunch
time and thus was unlawfully broad. The court fully agreed, adding
that in the absence of evidence that such a no distribution/no solicita-
tion rule was narrowly enforced and the employees were informed of
such enforcement, a "working hours" prohibition rule will be held to
be unlawfully broad.7'
In NLRB v. General Thermodynamics, Inc. ,72 the issue surrounding
the shop rule took an unusual twist. Ten months after a union organi-
zational campaign failed, the employer posted regulations prohibiting
solicitation on company time and distribution on company premises.
68. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
69. 667 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1981).
70. Id at 617 (emphasis supplied).
71. Id at 622. In a footnote, the court noted that the Board has only recently reversed its
previous position that a working time prohibition was not presumptively invalid. Id at 621 n.3.
See TRW Bearing Div. v. Anderson, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1981), overruling Essex Int'l, Inc., 211
N.L.R.B. 749 (1974). In Hammary Mfg. Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1982), the Board reversed a
previous position and now permits an annual United Way campaign as an exception to a no-
solicitation rule.
72. 670 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Shortly thereafter, based upon its attorney's advice, the employer re-
moved the posted material but made no direct effort to inform its em-
ployees that the rules had been rescinded.
The ALJ, not deciding whether the rules were unlawfully broad,
found no violation for the reasons that the "rules were removed prior to
their effective date, that they were never distributed and were never
enforced. . .[and] never implemented. . .. -73 The Board overturned
this decision, holding that "the posting in itself was sufficient promul-
gation to constitute a violation [and that] there is no evidence that [the
employer] made any effort to inform employees of this rescis-
sion. . . . ,74 On appeal, the employer did not seriously dispute the
illegality of the rules but instead centered its arguments on the fact that
the rules had never become effective.
The court was unpersuaded. In its view, the employer was assert-
ing an overly technical analysis and ignoring the reasonably foresee-
able effects of its conduct. While the employer knew the rules were
only being promulgated and not yet effective, the employees may not
have been aware of the rules' status or the significance of the difference,
if any. Moreover, the employer made no effort to inform the employ-
ees that the rules had been rescinded. The dilemma which confronted
the employees was explained by the court this way: "If nothing could
prevent an employer from promulgating an overbroad no-solicitation
and no-distribution rule and withdrawing it before it had technically
taken effect, the employees would be left to acting at their peril because
they would not be certain that the rules had no application.
75
Granting of Economic Benefits By Employer
During Organizational Campaign
There is perhaps no more basic principle in labor law than that an
employer is prohibited from conferring benefits upon its employees to
induce them not to join a union or to abandon union activity.76 The
simplicity of stating the principle is exceeded only by the difficulty and
uncertainty in its application.
The court attempted to clear up some of the murkiness that en-
gulfs this area of the law in Simpson Electric Co. v. NLRB, 77 the facts of
which are vital to its understanding. The union had engaged in a victo-
73. Id at 720.
74. Id at 721.
75. Id at 722.
76. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
77. 654 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1981).
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rious organizational campaign. The employer filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges, with the Board finding in its favor and ordering another
election. On the same day that decision was announced, the employer
announced increases in wages and other benefits to be effective in all of
its plants, including nine others not involved with the organizational
campaign or the election. The increases had all been planned and
budgeted before the first election. Furthermore, the employer ex-
plained that the timing of the increases was also due in some part to its
anticipation of an increase in the federal minimum wage and that in-
creases at recurrent intervals had become its regular practice. Soon
thereafter, the Board announced that the rerun election would be con-
ducted in three weeks. Charges were filed by the union regarding the
increases and the Board concluded that they were granted with an im-
proper motive. In fact, the record revealed that the general increases
were inconsequential. 78
The first issue was the Board's conclusion that the employer
should have refrained from giving an increase at all ten plants. The
court found this option totally unfair. Employees at the other plants
were mere bystanders who would be punished if the employer, acting
with an abundance of caution, cancelled increases for everyone. On
the other hand, granting the increases at the other plants but not at the
plant experiencing the organizational drive would have likely triggered
employee resentment because of the invidious discrimination. The
court was also puzzled by the Board's selection of an election date less
than one month following the alleged unlawful benefit increases. If the
Board sincerely believed that the increases tainted the election, the
court could not understand why the Board rescheduled the election so
soon after the employer's actions.
Turning to the merits of the employer's action, the court identified
the dilemma an employer frequently confronts if plans to increase the
employee benefit package coincidentally become effective at the time of
an election. The court was sensitive to this dilemma and the particu-
larly unique problems created in this regard by inflation. It held that
"a grant of benefits, according to a regular time pattern, not exceeding
the rate of inflation, and without special propaganda, should be viewed
as a neutral act, regardless of any mere time relation to an organizing
campaign, as long as inflation continues. ' 79 Applying this standard,
78. The court stated: "It is not found that Simpson's employees felt overwhelmed by any
unexpected shower of largesse." Id at 16.
79. Id at 18.
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the court refused to find the employer's actions unlawful. In addition
to finding all the criteria satisfied, the court emphasized that there was
no way for the employer to know when the rerun election would be
held at the time it announced the increases. Thus, it could not have
acted with the intent to influence that election.
Deferral of vacation benefits was the subject of the court's atten-
tion in NLRB v. General Time Corp. 80 In that case, for twenty years the
employer had scheduled a plant shutdown for the last two weeks in
July. For many of those years, the collective bargaining agreement ex-
plicitly set forth that period as a union member's first two weeks of
annual vacation accrued from the prior year but did not specify when
the pay for that vacation period was to be received. Past practice, how-
ever, called for payment on the Friday before the Monday that vaca-
tion was scheduled to begin. The contract expired in June, 1979, and
the union immediately struck. The employer engaged in its normal
shutdown at the end of July but did not pay accrued vacation benefits
to the union strikers while at the same time paying such benefits to all
non-union employees and skilled craft unit employees represented by
another union who did not cross the union's picket line. The union
strikers did not receive their vacation benefits until a new contract was
ratified in August, 1979. The Board found the employer to be in viola-
tion of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3).
The employer was guilty of an unfair labor practice unless it could
show that its refusal to grant vacation pay was justified and motivated
by legitimate objectives. The employer argued it was not required to
distribute vacation pay because vacation pay was just another negotia-
ble term in the contract and, in the absence of a contract, there could be
no contract violation. While finding the argument "disingenuous," the
court rejected it. The accrued vacation pay for each employee arose
from the previous contract, not the one being negotiated. And past
practice specified the date of distribution. The court made clear that it
was coercive for the employer to condition the receipt of benefits which
accrued under the old contract on ratification of the new contract.
With this same reasoning, the court further concluded that the em-
ployer's action in singling out these employees was patently
discriminatory.
Formation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
In two cases this term, the court discussed the criteria to be applied
80. 650 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1981).
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in determining whether an agreement has been reached during collec-
tive bargaining negotiations. By far, the more significant is Capitol-
Husting Company, Inc. v. NLRB.81
The employer had formerly been a member of a multiemployer
bargaining unit. Although the unit disbanded, remaining competitive
with the others was of paramount importance during contract negotia-
tions. During its negotiations the employer stated that it would agree
to match any agreement the union could reach with its competitors.
Although the union did not formally or expressly accept the offer, it did
end negotiation efforts with the employer and concentrated upon
reaching an agreement with any one of the employer's competitors. In
the next several months, the union and employer met only twice. Both
meetings were short and did not reach any substantive issues. Further,
no mention was ever made of the employer's offer to match. The union
was finally able to reach an agreement with one of the employer's com-
petitors. It then called upon the employer to honor the commitment to
match the agreement. The employer refused, contending that adopting
the contract would be "economic suicide."' 82 After further attempts to
resolve the labor dispute proved fruitless, the employees struck. The
ALJ, affirmed by the Board without comment, found that an agreement
to match had been reached which the employer unlawfully failed to
honor.
The court held that substantial evidence supported a finding that
the union manifested an acceptance at that first meeting. The court
believed that the manner in which the meeting concluded, the union's
reasonable reliance on the employer's representations and the foresee-
ability by the employer of the union's actions all constituted the neces-
sary substantial evidence. Perhaps the traditional rules of contract law
would not have found an acceptance and agreement in these circum-
stances but a reasoned and flexible application of those rules, the stan-
dard to be applied, certainly supported in the court's view the finding
of an agreement.
The court further held that a contract was reached even presum-
ing, as the employer asserted, only an offer to match was made at the
first meeting. It concluded that nothing occurred thereafter which
would constitute an implied revocation. The employer argued that the
absence of discussion regarding the offer to match at the two subse-
81. 671 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1982). The second negotiations case is Consolidated Coal v.
NLRB, 669 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1982), discussed at length infra in the text accompanying notes 91-
95.
82. 671 F.2d at 240.
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quent meetings, and its offers to extend the existing contract for an ad-
ditional year which were made, should have led the union to
reasonably believe that the offer to match had been withdrawn. The
court disagreed and relied upon an Eighth Circuit decision which held
that an offer, once made, remains on the bargaining table unless explic-
itly withdrawn by the offeror or unless circumstances arise which
would lead the parties to reasonably believe that the offer had been
withdrawn. 83
The flexibility in applying general principles of contract law
demonstrated by the court in Capitol-Husting leaves labor negotiators
in a slightly bewildering situation. But that same bewilderment existed
prior to Capitol-Husting and perhaps to a greater degree. The law gov-
erning collective bargaining on this subject is conflicting and unhelpful.
Capitol-Husting recognizes this problem and provides some assistance.
No more can really be expected without the court incurring the risk of
interfering with the "sanctity and integrity" of the bargaining process.84
While employers will undoubtedly be more aware of the dangers asso-
ciated with reliance on an implied revocation of an offer, unions must
be equally concerned with the dangers associated with reliance on an
implied or inferred acceptance. The tone of Capitol-Husting and the
uniqueness of its facts indicate that unions will not often prevail under
such a theory.
Meaning of Credibility Under Substantial Evidence Standard of Review
Section 10(e) of the Act sets forth the substantial evidence stan-
dard of review that courts must apply in reviewing the Board's findings
of fact.8 5 In the celebrated case of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 86
the Supreme Court announced the proper method of applying this
83. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1981). While approving the
general standard announced in Pepsi-Cola, the court withheld opinion on the Eight Circuit's ap-
plication of that standard in the context of a rejection. 671 F.2d at 244 n.5.
84. Id at 245. The Capitol-Husting court was quite mindful of the dangers resulting from
intrusion upon the private bargaining process. It stated:
This court is keenly concerned with not unduly intruding upon the collective bargaining
process and the right of parties to make their own agreements. Enforcing the Board's
order under these circumstances protects, rather than interferes with, the sanctity and
integrity of the bargaining process and in fact effectuates the federal policy of maintain-
ing and promoting "industrial peace."
Id
85. Section 10(e) of the act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.
86. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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standard where the decision of the administrative law judge differs
from the decision of the Board.
The "substantial evidence" standard is not modified in any way
when the Board and its examiner disagree. We intend only to recog-
nize that evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial
when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the wit-
nesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from
the Board's than when he has reached the same conclusion. . . . The
signiftcance of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance
of credibility in the particular case.87
Under the Universal Camera standard, the meaning of "credibility" as-
sumes enormous importance within the judicial reviewing process. In
Kopack v. NLRB, 88 the Seventh Circuit attempted to clarify the ambi-
guity surrounding the term "credibility" and narrow the range of
meanings courts have assigned to it.
In Kopack, the Board concluded, in overruling the decision of the
ALJ, that the dismissal of a father and son were not in retaliation for
the son's complaints about a lack of overtime pay. The issue revolved
around the extent to which the ALJ had relied upon "credibility" find-
ings in support of his decision. The two dismissed employees argued
that the ALJ's decision turned solely on "credibility" and that the
Board's decision was not, therefore, supported by substantial evidence
under Universal Camera.
The court recognized that credibility is at issue in practically every
case, or at least in any case involving testimonial evidence. Whenever
one side is found to prevail, the decision maker is inherently finding
toiat side's arguments more persuasive or credible than the other's. But
the court went on to declare that credibility has a much narrower
meaning if it is interpreted as synonymous with witness demeanor. Re-
lying on the analysis and conclusion of Judge Clifford Wallace in
Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 89 the court concluded that "credibil-
ity," as used by the Court in Universal Camera, refers only to witness
demeanor. Thus, to the extent that an ALJ's decision rests explicitly on
his evaluation of witness demeanor, the court is required to "weigh
those particular findings more heavily." 9 Applying this new meaning
of "credibility" to the record before it, the court upheld the Board's
decision on the ground that the ALJ's decision did not turn solely on
87. Id at 496 (emphasis supplied).
88. 668 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2278 (1982).
89. 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).
90. 668 F.2d at 954.
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witness demeanor but rather on inferences drawn from all of the
evidence.
Just two weeks after deciding Kopack, the court had another op-
portunity to apply to its new meaning of credibility in Consolidation
Coal Co. v. NLRB. 91 In that case, the union and employer entered into
negotiations regarding an absenteeism policy. An agreement was
reached subject to approval by the union membership. The member-
ship demanded certain changes and, after another negotiating session,
the employer consented to them. It agreed to type up the contract and
the union committee would then come and sign it. The union, how-
ever, experienced doubts about the exact meaning of the negotiated
clause. The chief union negotiator met with the chief employer negoti-
ator on January 23 and a mutually acceptable understanding was
reached. The union's negotiator testified that the employer's negotiator
stated he would have the agreement typed and ready for signing by the
union committee the next day. As scheduled, the union committee ar-
rived the next day for the signing but the employer failed to show.
Later, the employer's negotiator told the union's negotiator that the
contract was unacceptable to his superiors. The employees then went
out on strike contending that the employer reneged on the contract.
The ALJ had credited the testimony of the union's negotiator re-
garding the statements made at the conclusion of negotiations. Judge
Pell, writing for the panel as he did in Kopack, found that this action
was not a "credibility" determination because the ALJ's decision rested
not on demeanor but on an analysis of the evidence.92 While the ALJ
based his conclusion on the entire record including his "observation of
the witnesses," he never mentioned demeanor in comparing the testi-
mony of the two negotiators. The court believed that such a general
preliminary recitation "of a boilerplate nature" did not constitute a
finding based on demeanor.93 Thus, the court was essentially in as
good a position as the ALJ and the Board in determining which witness
more accurately recounted the statements made on January 23. Ana-
lyzing the testimony, the court found no "meeting of minds" had been
reached and, therefore, the employer could not have violated § 8(a)(5)
by not signing the contract.
After Consolidation Coal, credibility under the Kopack standard
assumes an extremely narrow meaning. There were two versions of
91. 669 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1982).
92. Id at 488.
93. Id
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what was said at the critical January 23 meeting. While the court em-
phasized that it was basing its decision on the union negotiator's ver-
sion of statements made, it cannot be seriously disputed that the court,
in the final analysis, elected to believe the employer's negotiator. No
other conclusion can be fairly drawn from a plain reading of the opin-
ion. The only justification given for this action was that the ALJ failed
to expressly and specifically state that his decision was based on de-
meanor.94 As a result, the court concluded that no part of the decision
was based on demeanor and was subject therefore to more exacting
judicial scrutiny. Whatever other significance this decision might have,
it is seemingly clear that only a very limited portion of an ALJ's deci-
sion is now protected from judicial scrutiny under the Universal Cam-
era cloak of "credibility." 95
Board Misconduct
The NLRB generally possesses broad discretion in terms of estab-
lishing policies and rules towards effectuating the purposes of the fed-
eral labor laws. That discretion, however, is not unlimited. When the
Board adopts a policy as guidance in the future exercise of its discre-
tion, subsequent decisions must be reasonably consistent with that ex-
pressed policy. Where the Board decides to modify or depart from that
established policy, it must explicitly announce the change and the rea-
sons for it.96 In Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 97 the court re-
freshed the Board's memory concerning the importance of this
principle.
In Consolidated Papers, the collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the employer and the union defined the Wisconsin bargaining
unit to include "hourly paid employees engaged in office and clerical
work."'98 Several groups of employees were expressly excluded as were
bargaining unit employees who performed work which was exempt
94. This appears to conflict with NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 687
(7th Cir. 1982), wherein the court stated that "explicit credibility findings are unnecessary when
the ALJ implicitly resolves conflicts in testimony as evidence by findings of fact which are sup-
ported by the record as a whole."
95. In NLRB v. Rich's Precision Foundry, Inc., 667 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1981) and Justak Bros.
& Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074 (7th Cir. 1981), the court reaffirmed the general principle that
absent exceptional circumstances, credibility determinations made by an ALJ ordinarily will not
be disturbed on review. Both of these cases were handed down before Kopack. It would appear
proper to now modify this principle to cover only "demeanor" determinations.
96. See Midwest Stock Exch., Inc. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
873 (1980). See also Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1982).
97. 670 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1982).
98. Id at 756.
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from the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In mid-
1979, six employees, salaried and exempt from FLSA coverage, were
transferred from Chicago to the Wisconsin plant. The union filed a
unit clarification petition pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), seeking to in-
clude these six employees in the Wisconsin bargaining unit. Before the
Board, the employer argued that a unit clarification petition could not
be entertained midway during the term of the existing collective bar-
gaining agreement because the transferred employees were excluded
from the bargaining unit by the terms of the contract and historical
practice. This argument was based upon the Board's policy announced
in Wallace-Murray Corp. 99 The Regional Director and the Board
failed to discuss or even mention the applicability of Wallace-Murray.
Rather, each addressed the merits of the accretion question and con-
cluded that the six employees shared a community of interest with the
unit employees sufficient to justify an accretion. The employer refused
to bargain with the union concerning these employees.
Writing for the court, Judge Cudahy did not reach the merits of
the accretion issue. Rather, he focused on Wallace-Murray and, con-
cluding that the rule retained full force and weight, whether it should
apply. Finding the case similar to the decision in Monongahela Power
Co. ,1o0 wherein the Board found Wallace-Murray applicable, the court
held that the Regional Director should have dismissed the union's unit
clarification petition. While refraining from scolding the Board for ig-
noring Wallace-Murray or for failing to articulate reasons why estab-
lished precedent was not followed, the court made undeniably clear
that the Board "remains obligated to apply its precedent with reason-
able consistency."'' ° i
Wildcat Strikes-Duty of Union to Exhaust Grievance Procedures
Under what circumstances may a union ignore the grievance pro-
cedure contained in a collective bargaining agreement and immediately
engage in a strike over a dispute which could conceivably be resolved
by that grievance procedure? In two cases this term, the court limited
the ability of a union to engage in such conduct.
In Irvin H. Whitehouse & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 0 2 several employees
walked off their jobs claiming that they were being required to work in
unsatisfactory conditions which OSHA later confirmed to be unsafe.
99. 192 N.L.R.B. 1090 (1971).
100. 198 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1972).
101. 670 F.2d at 758 n.6.
102. 659 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1981).
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The employees were dismissed and replaced. The union later filed
charges with the Board which held, in a 2-1 decision, that the employer
had violated § 8(a)(1). The Board reasoned that the employer and
union did not intend the contractual arbitration provision to extend to
the contract's "Occupational Safety Clause," and that implication of a
no-strike clause which would render the walkout unprotected was im-
proper. 0 3 The court disagreed and denied enforcement.
The issue was whether the contractual arbitration provision ex-
tended to safety disputes, thereby creating a no-strike obligation as to
such disputes. In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. Io and Gate-
way Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 0 5 the Supreme Court examined
this identical question and set forth the principles which govern the
existence and scope of implied agreements not to strike. First, the con-
tract must impose upon both parties the duty of submitting to final and
binding arbitration. Second, the matter in dispute must be one which
has been agreed will be covered by the compulsory terminal arbitra-
tion. The first of these requirements was undisputedly satisfied in
Whitehouse. It was the second to which the court devoted its attention.
The agreement in 4hitehouse granted the arbitration panel the
broad authority to "adjust disputes and grievances that may arise" and
"to interpret this agreement so as to give force and effect to the intent,
purpose and meaning of this agreement." 1o6While this arbitration pro-
vision was not as broad as that in Gateway Coal, t0 7 the court concluded
that the inclusion of the Occupational Safety Clause, which provided
that the parties "will cooperate in the prevention of accidents and in
protection and promotion of the safety and health of employees,"' 10 8
represented compelling evidence that the parties intended to arbitrate
such disputes. 109
In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 0 the employees walked off
their jobs in protest against the employer's unilateral change in job
classification procedures. The Board and the court both found that the
103. Id at 833.
104. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
105. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
106. 659 F.2d at 831.
107. The arbitration clause in Gateway Coal governed disputes "as to the meaning and appli-
cation of the provisions of this agreement," disputes "about matters not specifically mentioned in
this agreement," and "any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at the mine." 414 U.S. at 375.
108. 659 F.2d at 832.
109. "The specific inclusion of such aims as one of the purposes of the contract is perhaps
more compelling evidence of the parties' intent to arbitrate such disputes than is the sweeping, but
more general language of Gateway Coal." Id at 834.
110. 658 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1981).
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employer committed a § 8(a)(5) violation by failing to bargain over the
change before implementation. The Board further concluded that the
employee's wildcat strike was protected activity under the Mastro Plas-
tics rationale."'I That case has been interpreted by the Board to stand
for the proposition that "only strikes in protest against serious unfair
labor practices should be held immune from general 'no-strike'
clauses,"' 1 2 and that an unfair labor practice will be considered "seri-
ous" if it is "destructive of the foundation on which collective bargain-
ing must rest."'' 3
The pivotal issue in Caterpillar was whether the employer's
§ 8(a)(5) violation constituted a serious unfair labor practice. The
court held that it did not, refusing to create a general rule that all
§ 8(a)(5) violations are to be considered "serious" for purposes of Mas-
tro Plastics analysis. To do so would result in encouraging strikes
where contractual means of resolution might be available and success-
ful. It would also be inconsistent with the federal policy of promoting
the private resolution of labor-management disputes. The court did
not hold, however, that a § 8(a)(5) violation could never constitute a
serious unfair labor practice. The opinion suggests that unlawfully mo-
tivated § 8(a)(5) violations may be considered serious. 1 4 However,
where the refusal to bargain is precipitated by good faith reliance, even
though erroneous, upon the management prerogative clause, it is un-
likely that the court will characterize the refusal as serious for Mastro
Plastics analysis.
Duties of Union Steward During Illegal Work Stoppage
The union steward plays a particularly important role in the en-
forcement and administration of a collective bargaining agreement.
That role assumes added importance where the employees bypass the
grievance procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement
and illegally engage in a work stoppage. What duties does the steward
possess in preventing the stoppage and in working towards having the
employees return? What can the employer expect of the steward in this
regard? And what action may an employer take against the union
I11. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that absent clear evidence to the contrary, a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment will be deemed to apply only to economic strikes. An unfair labor practice strike is pro-
tected activity.
112. Arlan's Dep't Store of Mich., Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 802, 807 (1961), quoted in 658 F.2d at
1247.
113. 350 U.S. at 281, quotedin 658 F.2d at 1247.
114. 658 F.2d at 1248.
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steward alone, and under what circumstances, after the work stoppage
ends? These were questions previously addressed by the court in Indi-
ana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB." 5 During this term, the court
had two opportunities to apply the standards enunciated there.
In CH Heist Corp. v. NLRB," 16 the employer posted seniority lists
reclassifying and demoting some plant employees pursuant to its inter-
pretation of a recently negotiated collective bargaining agreement. The
employees challenged the propriety of this action and elected to walk
out rather than pursue their objections through the grievance proce-
dure. Prior to doing so, they consulted with their union steward who
urged them not to strike. After the picket line was established, the
steward refused to cross as the employer wanted him to do and reluc-
tantly participated in the strike. He did, however, continue to urge the
strikers to return to work and seek legal counsel. Upon the strike's
conclusion, the only disciplinary action taken against any employee or
union official was the dismissal of the steward. The Board found that
the employer violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) by dismissing the steward
solely on the basis of his status as a union steward.' 1 7
In Indiana & Michigan Electric, under very similar circumstances
involving the suspension of three union officials, the court denied en-
forcement of the Board's order, reasoning that "[t]he more severe pun-
ishment was not based merely on the officials' status but upon their
breach of the higher responsibility that accompanies that status, a
breach that makes their misconduct more serious than that of the rank-
and-file." 18 The collective bargaining agreement in Heist was inter-
preted by the court as even more general than the provisions in Indiana
& Michigan Electric. In addition to a no-strike clause, the agreement
provided that "[tihe steward's duties shall consist of seeing that all
terms and conditions of the Agreement are being complied
with. .... ,"119 The employer argued that this provision imposed upon
115. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has granted review in a case which
focuses on the question of a union official's higher duty to uphold a no-strike provision in a
collective bargaining agreement and the ability of an employer to selectively discipline union
officials for failing to satisfy that duty. Metropolitian Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982). See also Miller Brewing Co. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 962
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (union stewards cannot be subjected to greater discipline in the absence of a
collective bargaining provision creating higher duties for union officials during work stoppages);
Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (selective discipline for stewards valid where
permitted under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 188 (1982).
116. 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
117. Id at 181. The steward was the only one of 25 strikers disciplined.
118. 599 F.2d at 230.
119. 657 F.2d at 181.
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the steward, in addition to his attempts to dissuade the employees from
striking both before and after the strike, the obligation to cross the
picket line once the strike commenced.
The court refused to construe Indiana & Michigan Electric so
broadly. It held that in the absence of a clear contractual provision
requiring the steward to cross the picket line, the efforts of the steward
in this case were sufficient, if not the most effective possible, to satisfy
his obligation to see that the no-strike clause was complied with.
Moreover, it agreed with the union that requiring crossing of the picket
line "would have been suicidal to his union stewardship and his capac-
ity to enforce any provision of the bargaining contract."' 20 Indiana &
Michigan Electric was distinguished on the basis that the union offi-
cials' efforts to end the strike there were not as aggressive as the efforts
of the steward in Heist and were done belatedly.
Contrary to the court's assertions, the contractual language in
Heist is more specific than the language in Indiana & Michigan Electric
regarding the obligations of a union steward in the event of a strike.
Therefore, its attempt to distinguish Heist on this basis is unpersua-
sive.' 2' The pivotal consideration is what can realistically be expected
of a union steward, carefully keeping in mind the realities of a stew-
ard's power and the impact upon his relationship with his union mem-
bers, if crossing a picket line is construed as an implied requirement of
a contractual clause similiar to the one in question. Recognizing the
"suicidal" effects of such a requirement, the court correctly held that if
the employer desires actions by the steward which would involve more
than active discouragement of the strike, the employer must seek ex-
press inclusion of such a provision in the contract. An obvious out-
growth of Heist will be a greater concentration by bargaining parties
over the exact duties and obligations assumed and owed by stewards
and other union officials in the event of an illegal work stoppage. If the
duties and obligations are not expressly spelled out, employers should
not be surprised to find the court very unwilling to impose as a require-
ment anything more than vocal dissuasion.' 22
120. Id at 183.
121. In Heist, the court concluded that "[t]he contractual basis for the union steward's 'higher
responsibility' in this case is even more tenuous than in Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. " Id at
182. While just as generally worded as the clause in Indiana & Michigan Electric. see 599 F.2d at
228, the clause in Heist defining the steward's responsibilities is plainly more specific. See supra
text accompanying note 119. At minimum, the differences between the two provisions are legally
insignificant.
122. The second union steward case applying the Indiana & Michigan Elec. standard is Cat-
erpiller Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1981). With just a brief discussion, the
court found that the discharge of two union officials was provoked by their failure to satisfy their
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Rights and Status of Strikers
Over the years the Board, with judicial approval, 123 has distin-
guished the rights strikers enjoy and the responsive actions an em-
ployer may take against them based upon whether the strike is in
response to an employer's unfair labor practice or whether it is for
other reasons, typically in support of bargaining demands. The partici-
pants in the former are labeled unfair labor practice strikers and the
latter economic strikers.
In Atlas Metal Parts Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 124 the court described the
most important difference between the two. An unfair labor practice
striker is entitled to immediate and unconditional reinstatement to his
former job at the conclusion of the strike, even if the employer has
hired a replacement. If the job itself has been abolished, the employer
must offer a substantially equivalent position. In contrast, an economic
striker has no such job security. The employer is obligated to make an
unconditional offer to return to work, but only to meet its legitimate
staffing requirements. The economic striker has no right to displace a
permanent replacement nor is he entitled to a substantially equivalent
position. The risks of walking out for the economic striker are thus
much greater than those for an unfair labor practice striker.
The two cases decided this term involving the rights and status of
strikers are Capitol-Husting Company, Inc. v. NLRB 125 and Giddings &
Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB. 126 In Capitol-Husting, employees walked off their
jobs to protest the employer's failure to match the terms of another
collective bargaining agreement which the employer had earlier agreed
to match. 127 The employer hired replacements and offered them health
and pension benefits different from those provided for in the expired
contract. Several of the strikers decided to return to work and the em-
ployer permitted them to do so. However, the employer changed their
greater responsibility towards ending the strike. Little information is contained in the opinion,
however, concerning their actions before and during the strike as well as the applicable contrac-
tual provisions. As a result, the decision is of little value with respect to gaining a better under-
standing of Indiana & Michigan Elec.
123. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). In its 1982-83 term, the Supreme Court will address an issue involving
the rights of permanent replacements. The issue is one of jurisdiction: whether a state court has
the power to assume jurisdiction over employment rights of strike replacements or whether the
determination of such rights are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale, 622 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. App. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
124. 660 F.2d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 1981).
125. 671 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1982).
126. 675 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1982).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
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health and pension benefits to those being received by the replace-
ments. The Board, without comment, adopted the ALJ's unexplained
conclusion that the employer violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) by making
these changes and the court agreed.
In Keystone Steel & Wire v. NLRB, 128 the court held in part that
changes in health benefit programs constitute a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. An employer may not make changes in these
areas without first negotiating with the union. This requirement, how-
ever, does not apply to benefits received by replacements of striking
employees. In Leveld Wholesale, Inc. ,129 the Board adopted without
comment the AL's reasoning that the interests of replacements are dif-
ferent from those of strikers and the union cannot be expected to effec-
tively and fairly represent these inherently conflicting interests. In
Capitol-Husting, the court considered the reinstatement and displace-
ment rights to be crucial in concluding that the interests of returning
strikers were more closely aligned with those of strikers than with those
of replacements. Thus, the employer could not bypass the union and
unilaterally change the health and pension benefits for the returning
strikers.
It is important to note that the court limited its holding to re-
turning unfair labor practice strikers. 130 The reason for this action is
that reinstatement rights, the decisive factor underlying the decision,
differ for economic strikers. The potential significance this difference
possesses, if any, was left for another case.
In Giddings & Lewis, Inc., the issue was whether unreinstated eco-
nomic strikers have a right to be reinstated before laid-off permanent
replacement workers with less seniority are recalled. The governing
principle was expressed in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. , 3,
wherein the Supreme Court granted employers the right to perma-
nently replace striking employees in an effort to carry on its business.
As previously discussed, the court further held that economic strikers
are entitled to reinstatement only where vacancies arise or new jobs are
created. Finding Mackay to be dispositive, the Giddings court reasoned
that the employer's promulgation of the seniority rules was one way by
which it could assure the replacements the permanency of their em-
ployment. In light of typical and expected fluctuations in work force
levels and the probable necessity of at some point temporarily laying
128. 606 F.2d 171, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1979).
129. 218 N.L.R.B. 1350 (1975).
130. 671 F.2d at 248 n.7.
131. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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off employees, the employer's action "assure[d] replacements the per-
manent status to which Mackay says they are entitled."'' 32 If replace-
ments faced the loss of their jobs whenever a lay-off occurred, they
could hardly be called "permanent replacements." Such a result
"would eviscerate the Mackay rule." 133
Bargaining Orders
In the landmark case of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc. ,134 the
Supreme Court specified two circumstances in which the remedy of a
bargaining order is permissible in spite of the acknowledged preference
for an election. The first is where the employer's conduct is so outra-
geous and pervasive as to effectively prevent the holding of a fair and
reliable election at anytime in the future. The second includes cases
where the employer's unfair labor practices are less than pervasive but
which nevertheless have the tendency to undermine majority strength
and impede the election processes. 35 In this latter category, an addi-
tional prerequisite is a demonstration, typically through the use of au-
thorization cards, that the union had at one point achieved majority
support. In several cases this term, the court examined a variety of
problems encountered in the second category of bargaining orders.
In Justak Brothers & Company, Inc. v. NLRB, 13 6 the court first re-
jected several challenges to the validity of signed authorization cards.
It then concluded that a bargaining order was justified because of the
systematic nature of the employer's anti-union campaign, the participa-
tion of many supervisors, including that of a high corporate official,
and the failure by the employer to make any effort to neutralize any of
the coercive effects. The court also noted that the probable impact of
132. 675 F.2d at 930.
133. Id
134. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
135. In a recent decision, the Board reaffirmed the rule that a nonimajority bargaining order
may be issued in exceptional cases where the employer's "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair
labor practices eliminate any reasoned possibility of holding a free and uncoerced election.
Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 178 (1982). In Conair, dissenting Members Van de Water and
Hunter strongly attacked this rule on the basic ground that it confficts with the majority rule
doctrine paramount in the Act. The majority relied heavily upon the Third Circuit decision in
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980), wherein the court
affirmed the propriety of a Category I bargaining order, noting that "[ajlthough several commen-
tators have observed that the court [in Gissel] did not specifically endorse the issuance of bargain-
ing orders in the absence of a card majority, virtually every court that has discussed the issue has
stated that a bargaining order may be issued in the absence of a card majority." Id. at 1066.
On the same day the Conair decision was announced, the Board also reaffirmed the general
principles governing Category II cases. United Supermarkets, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1982).
136. 664 F.2d 1074 (7th Cir. 1981).
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unfair labor practices is increased where the size of the bargaining unit
is small.
In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 137 the court engaged in a
lengthy analysis of whether two women were employees on the date of
an election. The opinion centers upon the "reasonable expectation of
employment" standard. The extensive discussion and application of
the standard makes this case mandatory reading for any litigator con-
fronting the same issue.
Perhaps the most important issue addressed by the court in the
context of bargaining orders is the extent to which the Board is obli-
gated to articulate its reasons for invoking the drastic sanction. In
NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co. ,138 the unlawful actions of the
employer were nearly identical to those present in Justak Brothers. Al-
though the Board discussed in great detail the unfair labor practices
and the lingering negative impact they had on the union's organiza-
tional efforts, it failed to examine and expressly discuss the adequacy
and effectiveness of traditional remedies. In a recent decision, Red
Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 139 the Seventh Circuit emphasized
that the Board is required to make such "specific findings." But in Red
Oaks, as well as in Justak Brothers, the court created an exception to
this requirement where the reasons for the Board's issuance of a bar-
gaining order, while not expressly stated, are nevertheless obvious from
a clear record.140 In Berger Transfer, as in Justak Brothers,,41 the rec-
ord was sufficiently clear and obvious for the court to conclude that
traditional remedies were inadequate. As a result, the Board was found
to have acted within its discretion in issuing a bargaining order.
The NLRB and Undocumented Workers
One of the more important Seventh Circuit labor decisions in re-
cent years in NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc. (Sure-Tan I),142 wherein the court
held that undocumented alien workers are entitled to the protections of
the Act. The parties in that case made a reappearance before the court
this term seeking resolution of outstanding issues. Specifically, the is-
sue was whether the employer violated § 8(a)(3) by reporting the illegal
137. 668 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981).
138. 678 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982).
139. 633 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1980), reaffirming Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d
1108, 1118 (7th Cir. 1973).
140. 633 F.2d at 509.
141. The Red Oaks type exception was reaffirmed by the court in Justak Brothers in 664 F.2d
at 1081 n.2.
142. 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
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status of its foreign employees to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) following an election and certification of the union. 143
In Sure-Tan 11,144 the employer had engaged in pervasive anti-
union conduct prior to an election. On the day the Board gave it notice
that the election result in favor of the union would stand, the employer
sent a letter to the INS asking it to check the immigration status of five
employees. The INS' investigation revealed that each was living and
working illegally in the United States. Soon thereafter, all five volunta-
rily departed the country. Charges were subsequently filed, with the
Board concluding that the employer constructively discharged the em-
ployees in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) by sending the letter.
The employer raised several arguments before the Board and
court, one of the more important being that the letter to the INS did not
amount to a constructive discharge. The employer contended that its
action was legally protected and that it was the illegal status of the
employees which caused their departure, not the letter. The court
found these arguments completely without merit under the criteria for
a constructive discharge 45 and had little difficulty in finding that the
employer had acted with anti-union animus based on its flagrant viola-
tions of the Act as well as the proximity in time between the election
and the letter.
Having found the discharges to be in violation of § 8(a)(3), the
court engaged in the task of formulating a remedy. The interesting
aspect of this analysis is the merging of sometimes conflicting public
policy considerations between federal labor and immigration laws.
The ALJ had ordered the employer to mail reinstatement offers to the
employees but declined to recommend an award of back pay since he
believed the employees were unavailable for employment. The Board
found no evidence to support the AL's conclusion that they had not
returned to the United States or were unavailable for work, and modi-
fied the AL's recommendation by substituting the "conventional rem-
edy of reinstatement with backpay."1'4
The employer argued that the remedy created an irresolvable con-
flict between federal labor and immigration laws by encouraging illegal
143. The principal issue in Sure-Tan I was whether the employer was obligated to bargain
with the Board-certified union where a majority of the voting employees were illegal aliens. The
legality of the discharges was not addressed although predicted. Id at 360 n.9.
144. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270
(1983).
145. 672 F.2d at 600, citing NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en banc).
146. 672 F.2d at 602.
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entry into this country. The court was unpersuaded by this logic be-
cause it failed to recognize that the employees had voluntarily departed
the country and had not been deported. This distinction is important
because aliens who voluntarily depart enhance their prospects of later
legally returning. 147  The court also believed the remedy would not
likely serve as a sufficient inducement for the employees to return to
collect their relief by illegal entry. For these reasons, the court held
that the "remedy of backpay and reinstatement does not clearly flout
the immigration laws."' 48
In Sure-Tan I, Judge Wood criticized the majority, as well as the
Board, for ignoring the public policies underlying the federal immigra-
tion laws. 149 In Sure-Tan II, the employer filed a petition for rehearing
en banc. The petition was denied, but Judge Wood, joined by Judges
Pell and Coffey, again dissented. °5 0 He criticized the Board's "knot-
hole" approach to the case and its failure to understand the whole
problem presented by the unusual circumstances. In his mind, the
Board and the court were not giving due consideration to federal immi-
gration laws and he could not understand the "concocted remedy" of
reinstatement at a time when unemployment of American workers was
at a record high. He also reemphasized his view that congressional ac-
tion was needed "to relieve some of the tension between labor and im-
migration policies."''
Recent Developments in Section 301 Suits
Statute of Limitations
Since Congress has not enacted a statute of limitations to govern
actions brought pursuant to § 301,152 the Supreme Court has held that
the appropriate limitations period is to be determined by referring to
state law.' 53 In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, '54 the Supreme
Court resolved the question of which state limitations period is the
most appropriate. It held that the proper period is that governing ac-
147. Id at 599 n.ll, 603 n.16.
148. Id at 604.
149. 583 F.2d at 361-62 (Wood, J., dissenting).
150. 677 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1982).
151. Id at 585 (footnote omitted). Judge Wood noted that duplicate bills were pending in the
Congress which appeared to address some of the problems created by Sure-Tan I and I1. While
the Senate approved a bill which, inter alia, subjected employers to civil and criminal penalties for
knowingly employing illegal aliens (S. 2222), the House failed to reach a concensus on appropriate
sanctions and adjourned without taking any action.
152. See supra note 4.
153. International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
154. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
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tions to vacate arbitration awards and not that governing actions alleg-
ing breach of contract. 55 In Davidson v. Roadway Express, Inc. ,156 the
Seventh Circuit had its first opportunity to apply the Mitchell rule
under Indiana law in a suit by an employee against his employer. The
application was a simple one inasmuch as Indiana law expressly pro-
vides a separate statute of limitations for actions to vacate an arbitra-
tion award. 57
Two issues left unanswered in Mitchell have captured the attention
of the lower courts, and recently the attention of the Supreme Court
itself. The first is whether the same state limitations period should ap-
ply to both the union and employer. Several circuits have declared that
different limitations periods are appropriate 58 while others have sug-
gested otherwise. 5 9 The more interesting issue left undecided by
Mitchell is whether borrowing a state limitations period is appropriate
at all.
In Mitchell, the AFL-CIO, in an amicus brief, argued that the six
month limitations period found in § 10(b) of the NLRA should be ap-
plied in § 301 suits.' 60 The Court responded that certiorari was granted
"to consider which state limitations period should be borrowed, not
whether such borrowing was appropriate."' 6' It also noted that the ar-
gument had not been raised below and would make no difference in the
result reached. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart argued that
§ 10(b) should be the standard and that Hoosier Cardinal was no obsta-
cle. 162 In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun found much of Jus-
tice Stewart's analysis persuasive, but stated that "resolution of the
§ 10(b) question properly should await the development of a full adver-
sarial record."' 163 And in his opinion, Justice Stevens argued that
§ 10(b) "rests on a rationale that might apply to a § 301 claim against
155. Id at 62.
156. 650 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947 (1982).
157. IND. CODE 34-4-2-13(b) (West Supp. 1982) (90 days).
158. See Hand v. Local 328, Int'l Chemical Workers Union, 681 F.2d 1308 (11 th Cir.), rehear-
ing en bane granted, 692 F.2d 714 (1 Ith Cir. 1982); Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 678 F.2d 1276
(5th Cir. 1982).
159. See Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1982).
160. 451 U.S. at 60 n.2. Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976), provides that "no complaint
shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occuring more than six months prior to the filing
of the charge with the Board.
161. 451 U.S. at 60 n.2.
162. Id at 65-71 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters v. G.L. Cory, Inc., 685 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[A] uniform federal limitation
period might be desirable but 'neither national labor policy nor section 301's text or legislative
history supports creating one judicially.'" Id at 1142).
163. 451 U.S. at 64-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the union, but which is wholly inapplicable to the claim against the
employer, because the employer is not accused of any unfair labor
practice."' 164 Even the Seventh Circuit in Davidson noted the § 10(b)
issue, stating "that the logic of applying § 10(b) to a § 301 suit against a
union seems less compelling when, as here, the § 301 suit is filed
against the employer."' 165  Thus, Mitchell left considerable room for
lower courts to address the merits of the § 10(b) standard.
The Seventh Circuit, in several very recent decisions, 166 has ex-
pressed a willingness to follow the reasoning of Justice Stewart. A final
decision in this troubled area should be forthcoming. The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in two cases which raise both the propriety
of a § 10(b) standard and whether that standard, or the state limitations
period, should be applied to both the employer and union. 167
Exhaustion of Mandatory Intraunion Remedies
One of the more important labor law issues over which the courts
have disagreed is the availability to the employer and union of the de-
fense that an employee has failed to exhaust intraunion remedies
before instituting a § 301 suit. 168 With respect to the employer, some
courts hold that the defense is never available while others allow it pro-
vided certain conditions are satisfied. 169 With respect to the union, the
defense is generally available unless the employee would be unable to
obtain a fair hearing or full relief. 70 In Clayton v. International Union,
UAW, 71 the Supreme Court resolved the division, holding that "where
an internal union appeals procedure cannot result in reactivation of the
employee's grievance or an award of the complete relief sought in his
§ 301 suit, exhaustion will not be required with respect to either the suit
164. Id at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
165. 650 F.2d at 904 n.2.
166. Hall v. Local 3, Printing & Graphic Arts Union, No. 82-1109 (7th Cir. December 21,
1982); Stevens v. Gateway Transp. Co., No. 82-1222 (7th Cir. December 22, 1982); Evans v. Mais-
tin Transp., Ltd., No. 82-1426 (7th Cir. December 21, 1982).
167. Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steelworkers of Am., 671 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 442 (1982); Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3419 (Nov. 29, 1982).
168. See Fox & Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten
Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1980).
169. The Seventh Circuit rule provided that the defense is available to the employer if the
internal appeals procedure could result in reactivation of the grievance. Miller v. Gateway
Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir.
1977).
170. The Seventh Circuit rule provided that the defense is available to the union where the
internal union remedies are both mandatory and adequate. Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d
145 (7th Cir. 1978).
171. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
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against the employer or the suit against the union."' 172 Two cases this
term applied this holding.
The first was remanded by the Supreme Court for further consid-
eration in light of Clayton. In Tinsley v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ,173
the employee brought suit against the union and employer seeking only
money damages. In its previous decision, 7 4 the court had affirmed the
dismissal of the suit against the union but reinstated it against the em-
ployer because the relief of reinstatement or reactivation of the em-
ployee's grievance was not available from the union appeals procedure.
In its decision after remand, the court reaffirmed the dismissal of the
suit against the union but reversed itself with respect to the employer.
Its reasoning was quite simple. Because the employee only sought
monetary relief and not reinstatement, and the internal procedures
could provide such relief, he could receive complete relief by pursuing
his intraunion remedies. This was one of the standards enunciated in
Clayton. Thus, exhaustion was required.
The issue before the court was far more difficult in Miller v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. 175 The union and employer entered into a "Letter
Agreement" which created an intraunion appeals procedure providing
for the reinstatement of employee grievances if one of the internal ap-
pellate tribunals determined that the grievance had been improperly
disposed of by union officials. Another provision of the agreement
shielded the employer from back pay liability for the period of time
between the initially improper disposition of the grievance and its later
reinstatement. The employee challenged the adequacy of the intraun-
ion procedures, specifically the backpay limitation proviso, as failing to
satisfy the Clayton "complete relief' standards. The court disagreed.
The plain language in Clayton fully supports the court's decision.
Exhaustion of intraunion procedures under Clayton is required wher-
ever one of two results can be produced: either reactivation of the
grievance or complete relief. "In either case, exhaustion of internal
remedies could result in final resolution of the employee's contractual
grievance through private rather than judicial avenues."' 176 The Miller
court essentially applied a balancing test bearing in mind the policy
considerations underlying the standard in Clayton. The importance of
172. Id at 685. The court also mentioned two other factors that might excuse a failure to
exhaust: (1) inability to obtain a fair hearing because of the hostility of union officials, and (2) un-
reasonable delay of a judicial hearing if exhaustion is required. Id. at 689.
173. 665 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1981).
174. 635 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1980).
175. 675 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1982).
176. 451 U.S. at 692.
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the private resolution of labor disputes was weighed against and took
precedence over the individual employee's right to be fully compen-
sated for the wrong he has allegedly suffered.
177
Proper Defendants
The recently increased use by employers of specialized labor con-
sultants to assist in stifling unionization, and destroying unionization
once achieved, has provoked understandable and widespread furor in
the labor community. The manner in which the conduct of such con-
sultants fits into the scheme of § 301 was examined in Loss v. Blanken-
ship. 178 The employer there hired Blankenship, a labor relations
expert, for the acknowledged purpose of helping it to induce the decer-
tification of the union. While not successful in achieving decertifica-
tion, Blankenship did succeed in disrupting ratification of a collective
bargaining agreement by inducing a strike. The Board found that the
employer had violated the Act through the acts of its agent Blanken-
ship. 17 9 Additionally, the union and several employees representing a
class of all employees instituted a § 301 action against Blankenship per-
sonally seeking injunctive and monetary relief. The district court dis-
missed the complaint because Blankenship was not a party to the
collective bargaining agreement upon which the complaint was based.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Relying upon similar decisions from 1969180 and the Fifth Cir-
cuit,' 8' the court construed § 301 as not providing the basis for a claim
against a non-party to the underlying collective bargaining agreement.
The court found that the scheme of liability under the LMRA itself
supported this conclusion by providing that the employer would be lia-
ble for the wrongdoing of its agents. 182 Thus, the employees here were
177. The Supreme Court has recently granted review in a case which addresses this area in a
little different manner. In Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981), the district court found that the employee had been discharged
without cause and that the union had breached its fair representation duty. The employee was
awarded back pay but the district court apportioned part of that award to the union because its
conduct contributed to the accretion of lost wages. The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that
back pay was the exclusive obligation of the company. Whether a union, whose breach of fair
representation duty contributed to an increase in lost wages, can be held liable for a fair portion of
those lost wages is the issue presented to the Court. Union liability in § 301 suits was addressed by
the Court in Hines, Vaca and Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
178. 673 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1982).
179. The Board petitioned for enforcement, id. at 945, but later had it withdrawn.
180. Baker v. Fleet Maintenance, Inc., 409 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1969).
181. Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1980).
182. Section 301(b) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976), provides that:
. [Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce
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not without a remedy. They had only selected the wrong defendant.
This factor distinguished the case from Third and Ninth Circuit deci-
sions permitting suit against a non-party 8 3 as well as a recent decision
permitting suit against a competitor of the employer which had in-
duced a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 84 The ability
to obtain full relief from the employer was the pivotal consideration in
the court's holding "that a complaint for interference with a collective
bargaining agreement, against a non-party to that agreement, is not ac-
tionable under § 301(a) of the LMRA."'' 85
Injunctive Relief
The power of a federal court to issue injunctive relief during a
labor dispute is a very narrow and limited one. The source of this re-
stricted power is the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 which withdraws
from the federal courts all jurisdiction to issue injunctions in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute. 86 Two decisions by the
Supreme Court in the 1970's placed a judicial gloss on this statutory
prohibition. 87 During this past term, the court reviewed the history of
the labor injunction and applied the prevailing law to a management-
labor dispute which is increasing in frequency.
In Local Lodge No. 1266, International Association of Machinists v.
Panoramic Corp.,188 a collective bargaining agreement contained a
broad arbitration clause as well as a provision which made the agree-
ment binding on "successors and assigns" of the employer. The em-
as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined
in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents.
183. Those cases are cited in 673 F.2d at 947-48.
184. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Local 120, Newspaper Guild, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1003 (1982).
185. 673 F.2d at 948. In a separate count the plaintiffs alleged that Blankenship tortiously
interfered with the contractual relationship between the union and employer. The court held that
this state law claim falls within the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. It rejected Blankenship's
contention that the membership of the entire international union must be considered in determin-
ing the local union's citizenship. Id at 948-51.
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976). Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101,
provides:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or grow-
ing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chap-
ter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued
contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 104 (enumeration of specific acts not subject to restraining orders or
injunctions).
187. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Local 770, Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See also Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v.
International Longshoremen's Assoc., 102 S. Ct. 2673 (1982).
188. 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ployer announced that it was selling a division of its operations and
that the proposed purchaser contemplated no changes in the terms and
conditions of employment. Soon thereafter, the purchaser informed
the employees that they all would be terminated and would have to
reapply if they wished continued employment. The union protested to
the employer and purchaser but to no avail. It then filed a grievance
with the employer charging that its actions constituted a breach of the
"successors and assigns" clause by failing to secure from the purchaser
a commitment to assume the obligations under the existing contract. It
also requested a postponement of the sale pending resolution of the
grievance. The employer agreed to arbitration but refused to delay ex-
ecution of the sale. The union then filed a complaint in federal district
court seeking a preliminary injunction restraining the employer, pend-
ing arbitration, from completing the sale without requiring the pur-
chaser to assume the contract. The district court granted relief.
The appellate court's opinion, by Judge Cudahy, provides a text-
book summary of the labor policy considerations implicated by the la-
bor injunction and comprehensively covers the judicial interpretations
of Norris-LaGuardia. An in-depth analysis of the two landmark
Supreme Court cases is also provided which serves as the centerpiece of
the court's decision.
The key principle highlighted by the court is that labor dispute
injunctions are specifically limited to those situations where such equi-
table relief is necessary to enforce the agreement to arbitrate between
the employer and union. With this principle in mind, the court con-
cluded that federal courts possess the authority to enjoin employer ac-
tions, as well as union actions, to preserve the status quo pending
arbitration. It then adopted the standard announced in Lever Brothers
Co. v. Local 217, International Chemical Workers, 189 holding that a
Boys Market injunction' 9° against employer breaches of a collective
bargaining agreement may be issued "where the underlying dispute is
subject to mandatory arbitration under the labor contract and where an
injunction is necessary to prevent arbitration from being rendered a
meaningless ritual."'191 It further held that, as in all Boys Market cases,
the traditional equitable requirements of irreparable injury, a balance
189. 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
190. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Local 770, Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (injunction
may issue when the contract "contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration proce-
dure" and the union has agreed to settle disputes through such procedures rather than resorting to
a strike).
191. 668 F.2d at 283.
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of hardships and probability of success on the merits will also be re-
quired. 92  Finding all of these requirements satisfied, the court af-
firmed the issuance of the injunction. 193
REVIEW OF 1981-82 EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS 19 4
Age Discrimination
Two very important decisions Were handed down this term under
192. Id.
193. Contra, United Automobile Workers v. LaSalle Machine Tool, Inc., No. 82-1223 (6th
Cir., Dec. 29, 1982).
194. Due to the large number of employment related cases decided this past term, it is
impossible to discuss each and every one. The following is a listing of decided cases not found in
the text, accompanied with a brief statement of the holding or subject matter examined. Rockford
Drop Forge Co. v. Donovan, 672 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1982) (OSHA empowered to obtain inspection
warrant exparte under 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4; employer not entitled to advance notice from OSHA
prior to its obtaining inspection warrant; striking employees or their representatives can be proper
complainants under 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1)); Janowski v. Local No. 710, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
673 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 130 (1982) (complex and comprehensive
examination of private pension plan's conformity with ERISA requirements, particularly accrual
of benefits for part-time service); Local 194 C & T v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 672 F.2d 621 (7th
Cir. 1982) (dispute regarding the allocation of work among various employee groups resulting
from an agreement between Conrail and national union held subject to mandatory arbitration
under 45 U.S.C. § 777); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a significant or substantial statistical disparity indicating racial discrimination);
Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982) (Title VII violation committed if
black employee can show he was dismissed for attempting to prevent his superiors from
discriminating against a female white employee on sex and race grounds); Mid-America Regional
Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 132 (1982) (agreement between public utility, contractor and union, calling for the
deposit of funds into an escrow account during strike to continue work on utility's project, fell
within both statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions to antitrust laws); Fire Equip. Mfr.'s
Ass'n, Inc. v. Marshall, 679 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982) (trade association representing manufacturers
of fire-fighting equipment has no standing to challenge validity of amendment to fire safety
standards in 29 C.F.R. § 1910); Jones v. United States, 680 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1982) (decedent did
not give constructive or implied notice that spouse was not to receive retirement annuity pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. § 8341(b)); United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 653 F.2d 1134
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) (federal court has jurisdiction to issue injunction
against work stoppage by federal employees in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7311); Chicago Cartage Co.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 659 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1981) (arbitration award of Joint
Committee "drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement"; no evidence to support
employer charge that Committee was arbitrary, partial or engaged in acts of misconduct; court
reporter not required at arbitration hearing); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310
(7th Cir. 1981) (arbitration award upheld under Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10); United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers Local 798 v. Donovan, 652 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1981)
(sufficient evidence did not support Secretary's decision that certain union members were not
eligible for worker adjustment assistance under Subchapter II, Part 2 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2271-2322 (1976)); English v. Local Union No. 46, 654 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1981) (union
member had right, under 29 U.S.C. § 431(c), to seek access to the books and records of local as
they relate to LM-2 reports filed by the union with the Secretary of Labor); Butler Lime & Cement
Co. v. OSHA, 658 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1981) (citation issued to employer dismissed for OSHA's
failure to comply with previous mandate of the court and the lack of substantial evidence
supporting the Commission's decision); Super Excavators, Inc. v. OSHA, 674 F.2d 592 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982) (credibility determination by ALJ regarding expert
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 195 In
EEOC v. Elrod,196 the court decided the constitutionality of the 1974
amendment to the ADEA which extended the protections of the Act to
federal, state and local government employees. 197 Exhaustively review-
ing the legislative history of the ADEA and all its amendments, 98 as
well as related federal employment legislation, 99 the court concluded
that the amendment is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 2°° This decision is in accord
with the overwhelming majority of cases which have decided this
testimony upheld in absence of contrary documentary evidence or physical facts; violation upheld
despite the fact the violation posed no "significant risk" of harm to employee; 29 C.F.R.
§ 1926.652(b) not vague); Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.),
ceri. denied, 454 U.S. 1100 (1981) (computation of back pay and attorneys' fees against employer
for Title VII violations not in error or abuse of discretion; refusal to hold union liable for back pay
and attorneys' fees despite Title VII violation not an abuse of discretion; Alvarez v. Joan of Arc,
Inc., 658 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (interpretation of 7 U.S.C. § 2050a(b) in Espinoza v. Stokely-
Van Camp, Inc., 641 F.2d 535, 538-39 (7th Cir.),petition for cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950 (1981),
overruled; statutory language to read "award damages up to $500 for each violation"); Martinez v.
Swift & Co., 656 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1981) (actions of Pension Board following nationalization and
expropriation of employer by Cuba not "arbitrary, fraudulent or in bad faith"); Saltzman v.
Fullerton Metals Co., 661 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1981) (evidentiary and discovery rulings did not
deprive plaintiff of fair trial for alleged Equal Pay Act violations); Boyd v. Madison County Mut.
Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982) (maintenance of sexually
discriminatory bonus attendance policy a continuing violation for Title VII purposes; employer
successfully produced legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for limiting bonus plan to all clerical
employees who happened to all be female, and not extending it to claims adjustors who happened
to all be male); EEOC v. St. Anne's Hospital of Chicago, Inc., 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981)
(conciliation efforts by the EEOC prior to the issuance of a reasonable cause determination are not
required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)); Van Fossan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local
710, 649 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1981) (for the minimum vesting requirements of § 203(a) of ERISA,
29 U.S.C. § 1053(a), to apply, "one must be an employee after its effective date and the forfeiture
of one's benefits must occur after its effective date"; pension plan's "break in service" provision
held not to be "arbitrary or capricious" where the break in service is voluntary); Marquardt v.
North Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1981) (criteria to be applied in determining the
appropriateness of attorney's fees to ERISA defendants pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1));
Cannon v. Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, 657 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1981) (restricted delivery
agreement between liquor distributors and truck driver union exempted from antitrust laws
because it concerned conditions of employment); Chicago Truck Drivers v. National Mediation
Bd., 670 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1981) (assertion of jurisdiction by NMB over representation dispute
involving Federal Express drivers not a final agency action subject to judicial review nor a
recognized exception under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)); United States v. Chicago, 663
F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc) ("changed circumstances" required modification by district
court of permanent injunction establishing promotion quotas within the Chicago Police
Department; evidentiary hearing required to examine Title VII validity of procedures used in
compiling current promotion eligibility roster); Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655
F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981) (no probable cause for issuance of inspection warrant).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
196. 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
198. 674 F.2d at 604-07.
199. Id at 607-09.
200. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment grants Congress the power "to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article."
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issue. 20'
While not necessary to its decision, a majority of the panel also
concluded that the amendment would be a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. The local governmental
body argued that the amendment violated the tenth amendment limita-
tion on the Commerce Clause recognized in the landmark case of Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery.20 2 In National League, the Supreme
Court invalidated the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act extending coverage of the FLSA to state and local government em-
ployees on the ground that they impermissibly interfered with the "in-
tegral governmental functions" of the states and their political
subdivisions.20 3 As the 1974 ADEA amendment was included with the
FLSA amendments during congressional enactment, the local govern-
mental body contended that both should be treated in the same man-
ner. Applying the circuit's narrow reading of National League and
recognizing the far more limited intrusion on, and interference with,
state and local sovereignty by the ADEA than the FLSA, the majority,
with Judge Pell dissenting, had "no difficulty" in holding that if the
1974 ADEA amendment is viewed as an exercise of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause, the amendment does not conflict with the
tenth amendment. 204
In Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing Co., Inc. ,205 the
court set forth the standard for willfulness under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), a
showing which is required before a plaintiff may recover liquidated
damages under the ADEA.20  Reviewing the divergent interpretations
provided by several courts of appeals, 20 7 the court held that "a plaintiff
must show that the defendant's actions were knowing and voluntary
201. Cases are cited in 674 F.2d at 609 n.9. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo.
1981), the district court concluded that the ADEA was enacted pursuant solely to the commerce
clause and not under the fourteenth amendment. It further concluded that the 1974 amendment
intruded on state sovereignty in violation of the tenth amendment under National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Accord, Campbell v. Connelie, 542 F. Supp. 275 (N.D. N.Y.
1982). The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding the 1974 amendment constitutional and not
in violation of the tenth amendment. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
202. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
203. Id at 851.
204. 674 F.2d at 612.Accord, Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, 536 F. Supp. 236
(SD. Ga. 1982).
205. 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981).
206. Relief under the ADEA is limited to back pay. However, an additional equal amount is
available in case of willful violation; 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part that:
"[L]iquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter."
207. The court cited and discussed Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1981);
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619
F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980); and Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (Ist Cir. 1979).
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and that he knew or reasonably should have known that those actions
violated the ADEA.' '20 8 The court went on to add that the latter factor
"implies that the plaintiff must show two things: (1) that the employer
knew or reasonably should have known what the requirements of the
ADEA are; and (2) that the employer knew or reasonably should have
known that his actions towards the plaintiff were inconsistent with
those requirements. '' 2°9 The Syvock opinion goes on to apply its new
interpretation of willfulness in addition to examining a number of
damage issues, including mitigation, computational methods, unem-
ployment compensation offset,210 prejudgment interest 21 ' and attor-
neys' fees.212 It should be required reading for any ADEA litigant.
Title VII
The 1981-82 term was marked by several significant decisions
under Title VII,213 each of which warrants detailed discussion beyond
the space limitations of this article.
In Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp. ,214 the employee unsuccess-
fully pursued her discrimination charge to the state administrative
agency, the state trial court and the state appellate court. She then filed
the identical action in federal court and ultimately prevailed. On ap-
peal, the employer argued that the employee was precluded from pur-
suing her claim in federal court under the doctrines of collateral
estoppel or election of remedies. The court rejected this argument
based upon the fact that, except for the Second Circuit,21 5 every court
of appeals had rejected any application of the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel or election of remedies to Title VII actions in federal
208. 665 F.2d at 156 (footnote omitted).
209. Id n.10. The court noted that the first requirement should be easily met by the fact that
the posting of notices is required under Department of Labor regulations. It is the second require-
ment which will pose the greatest obstacle for the plaintiff.
210. Whether to decrease a back pay award by an individual's unemployment compensation is
a determination left to the sound discretion of the district court. Id at 161-62. Contra, Kauffman
v. Sidereal Corp., 677 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1982).
211. Prejudgment interest lies within the trial court's discretion. 665 F.2d at 162.
212. Award of attorney's fees should not be reduced by the plaintiff's failure to prevail on
willfulness and mitigation questions. Id at 162-65.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
214. 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981). The employer subsequently filed a petition for writ of
certiorari which was granted on June 1, 1982. 102 S. Ct. 2288. The judgment was vacated and the
case remanded for further consideration in light of Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 102 S. Ct.
1883 (1982), discussed in the next paragraph of the text. On remand, the Seventh Circuit, in
response to the inquiries that Justice Blackmun suggested must be made, 102 S. Ct. at 2289, held
that Kremer controlled and that: (I) the standards of review applied by the Illinois and New York
courts were essentially the same, and (2) Kremer should be applied retroactively. 693 F.2d 703
(7th Cir. 1982).
215. Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979).
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court where there have been previous state proceedings. 21 6
The Unger principle was overruled by the Supreme Court in
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. ,217 wherein the Court affirmed
the rule of the Second Circuit that a federal court must, under the full
faith and credit clause, give preclusive effect to a decision of a state
court when the state court's decision would be res judicata in the state's
own courts. The impact of Kremer from a practical standpoint could
be greatly lessened if complainants elect not to seek state judicial re-
view of adverse state administrative decisions. 218 Therefore, the impor-
tant and unresolved issue left by Kremer is whether a state
administrative decision, following a full and fair evidentiary hearing, is
entitled to any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in the federal
action. 219
In Lehman v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. ,220 a charge of reverse
discrimination was before the court. A black employee was hired for a
higher position over a white employee not pursuant to any formalized
plan, but upon the branch manager's ad hoc consideration of race as a
plus factor. The issue was whether the manager's action was permissi-
ble under the Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber.22! Informal affirmative action programs were not
present in Weber but the Lehman court found that the public policy
considerations discussed therein provided guidance. Those considera-
tions include the need for affirmative action, whether the adopted plan
satisfied that need and whether the plan would remain active once the
216. Cases are listed in 657 F.2d at 914. The Seventh Circuit was one of the first courts of
appeals to adopt this principle in Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 477 (7th Cit. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975).
217. 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982).
218. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in Kremer: "The lesson of [Kremer] is: An
unsuccessful state discrimination complainant should not seek state judicial review. If a discrimina-
tion complainant pursues state judicial review and loses-a likely result given the deferential stan-
dard of review in state court-he forfeits his right to seek redress in a federal court." 102 S. Ct. at
1909 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Justice Blackmun also pointed out another consequence of Kremer which could potentially
frustrate the effectiveness and integrity of the state scheme:
Indeed, a prudent discrimination complainant may make every effort toprevent the state
agency from reaching a final decision. If the complainant prevails after a full hearing, he
runs the risk that his adversary may seek judicial review. He could then find himself
closed out of federal court if a state court decides that the agency's decision is unsup-
ported by sufficient evidence.
Id n. 18 (emphasis in original).
219. See Snow v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 543 F. Supp. 752 (D. Nev. 1982) (administrative
proceeding has no collateral estoppel effect but may be admitted as evidence in the federal court
action).
220. 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
221. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For a comprehensive analysis of Weber, see Blumrosen, Affirmative
Action in Employment Afler Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1981).
LABOR LAW
racial imbalances were eliminated.222 The Lehman court found the
manager's decision-making process seriously flawed under each factor.
The hiring was made "without any idea of a goal for which minority
hiring should reach nor with any idea of when such a level was
reached. ' 223 This created the danger that non-minority employees
would be treated unfairly after the racial imbalances had been reme-
died. The relatively haphazard nature of the manager's decision and
the potential unfairness to non-minority employees posed by it, specifi-
cally the insufficiency of substantive and procedural safeguards, were
the fundamental concerns of the court.
While concluding there was a Title VII violation, the court made a
special effort to reassure civil rights advocates that its decision should
not "be understood as a setback for affirmative action in general or
affirmative action at smaller places of employment. '224 The court em-
phasized that its decision was made on a "unique record" and inter-
posed "between the Scylla of Bakke and the Charybdis of Weber. ' 225
The precedential value of Lehman to affirmative action opponents will
likely be scant.
One of the more difficult concepts in the area of employment dis-
crimination for practitioners and courts alike is the continuing viola-
tion theory enunciated by the Supreme Court in UnitedAir Lines, Inc.
v. Evans.226 In Stewart v. CPC International, Inc. ,227 the Seventh Cir-
cuit comprehensively summarized the various situations which give rise
to a continuing violation. 228 The specific situation before it involved an
allegation of continuous and covert discrimination evidenced by a se-
ries of discriminatory acts. The employer in the case challenged the
suit as failing to comply with the EEOC time requirements for filing.
The court stated that under this particular sub-theory:
At least one discriminatory act must have occurred within the
charge-filing period. Discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the
Keriod constitute relevant evidence of a continuing practice, and may
elp to demonstrate the employer's discriminatory intent .... But
the prior discriminatory acts do not come into play at all unless the
plaintiff can show in the first place that the discrimination is "pres-
222. 651 F.2d at 526-27.
223. Id at 527.
224. Id at 528 (footnote ommitted).
225.. Id (footnote omitted).
226. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). See generally Carty, The Continuing Violation Theory of Title VII
After United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 429 (1980); Note, Continuing Violations of
Title VII: A Suggested,4pproach, 63 MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978).
227. 679 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1982).
228. The court discussed three different situations to which a continuing violation theory has
been applied, all summarized in Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., 79 F.R.D. 580 (D. Minn. 1978).
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ently" continuing.229
It then held that the act relied upon by the plaintiff to establish that
past discrimination continued into the present was not a Title VII vio-
lation because the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of showing
that the employer's asserted justification for its action was a mere pre-
text. Thus, there was no discriminatory act within the filing period and
there was no continuing violation. 230
In EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp.,231 the EEOC applied to the
district court for enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum which the
court granted. On appeal, the employer raised numerous errors includ-
ing the district court's refusal to allow it to file an answer or counter-
claim or hold an evidentiary hearing. The court rejected each
argument, reasoning that the employer was applying an overly techni-
cal and formalistic analysis of the administrative subpoena enforce-
ment process.232 Moreover, all of the employer's essential points were
contained in the record which the district court fully reviewed. Thus,
nothing was sacrificed in terms of fact or argument in denying the filing
of an answer or counterclaim. As there were no facts in dispute, the
employer suffered no prejudice from the absence of an evidentiary
hearing.
One of the other objections raised by the employer concerned the
breadth of the subpoena by its inclusion of confidential information.
The court summarily dismissed this argument by relying on the crimi-
nal penalties contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e) for
EEOC personnel who disclose investigatory information.233
An interesting factual situation was before the court in EEOC v.
St. Anne's Hospital of Chicago, Inc. 234 There, a white female manager
hired a black man to fill a security position at the hospital. The hospi-
tal received threats against the life of the manager for the hiring and
several unexplained fires occurred. As a result, the hospital dismissed
her. The issue was whether the proscriptions of Title VII's "opposition
clause," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), applied.235 The hospital argued that
this clause applies solely to an individual who opposes a practice of an
229. 679 F.2d at 121.
230. In a single paragraph, the court also rejected plaintiff's assertion of a "present-effects-of-
past-discrimination" theory of continuing violation. Id. at 122.
231. 668 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981).
232. 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1976).
233. Those criminal penalties include a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not
more than one year.
234. 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976) provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
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employer that has unlawfully discriminated against minorities. The
majority declined to accept such a narrow interpretation. They con-
cluded that "an employee with hiring authority who hires the applicant
she believes is best qualified and subsequently is discharged because
the applicant she hired is black is similarly protected. ' 236 They were
unwilling to allow employees in decision-making positions to be con-
stantly concerned with losing their jobs by hiring a minority person and
thereby inciting the racial bias of others. In response to the hospital's
position that the threats were the reason for the discharge and not her
hiring decision, the majority analogized the argument to "customer
preference" cases and rejected it, stating that "[ilt would be a sad day
for the enforcement of Title VII if every unlawful threat of violence
motivated by racial hate could make lawful the discharge of an em-
ployee for a hiring decision that was itself required by the Act. 237
The majority was not entirely insensitive to the plight of the hospi-
tal. They stated that no violation would be found if the hospital could
demonstrate that no alternative course of action was available and that
it could not continue to function safely with that employee remaining
in her position. 238 In the majority's view, enlistment of increased police
protection and investigation could have alleviated the threat. Disagree-
ment on this point prompted Judge Pell to dissent. 239 He believed it
was clear that the employee had not been terminated for hiring a black
man but because of the threats and fires. Under the particular dangers
presented to patient welfare and safety, he could not fault the hospital
for its actions and, indeed, suggests that not taking that action might
have been characterized as irresponsible. It was the nature and reality
of the threats which mandated that the action be taken. Acknowledg-
ing the majority's position that other less severe alternatives were avail-
able, Judge Pell responded: "[N]o one . . . will ever know whether
taking other steps might have been followed by a disaster of substantial
extent. ' '24° He added that the hospital's action was nothing more than,
at most, a "poor business judgment call," 241 and not an act of racial
discrimination which Title VII was designed to eliminate.
of his employees. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this subchapter ...
236. 664 F.2d at 132 (footnote omitted).
237. Id at 133.
238. Id at 133-34.
239. Id at 134-35 (Pell, J., dissenting).
240. Id at 135.
241. Id
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In Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian,242 an individual alleged that he
was not hired for a position because he was a Latino and that a white
applicant was instead hired. One of the arguments asserted by the
plaintiff was that the burden was upon the employer to show that the
person hired was more qualified than him, and that absent such a
showing, he was entitled to a favorable finding. The court rejected this
argument, relying on Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine. 243
This same burden question was examined by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Aikens v. United States Postal
Service .244 In that case, the appellate court held that the district court
erred in imposing upon the plaintiff the initial burden of proving that
he was as qualified or more qualified than the person who was pro-
moted. Such a showing is unnecessary to make aprimafacie case.245
The Supreme Court had previously granted the Postal Service's peti-
tion for writ of certiorari and remanded the case to the court of ap-
peals.246 Certain questions surrounded Aikens in light of the Supreme
Court's action, despite Justice Marshall's eloquent dissent, 247 vacating
and remanding it for further consideration in light of Burdine, a case
the lower court had expressly relied upon in its previous decision. On
remand, the court of appeals again held that a plaintiff, to establish a
primafacie case, need not show that he was more qualified than the
person actually selected.248 The case has returned to the Court and a
final decision on the merits will be rendered. 249 It could be one of the
most important employment discrimination decisions the Court will
render.
OSHA
Two extremely important decisions were handed down by the
court this term concerning the vagueness of OSHA regulations. The
panel in both decisions was comprised of Chief Judge Cummings, Se-
nior Judge Swygert and Senior District Judge Jameson.
242. 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981).
243. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
244. 642 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 902 (1981).
245. In addition to Burdine, the court relied upon McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 1
U.S. 792 (1973).
246. 453 U.S. 902 (1981). The petition for writ of certiorari by Aikens was denied in 453 U.S.
912 (1981).
247. Id at 3135-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
248. 665 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
249. Cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1707 (1982).
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In Matter of Metro-East Manufacturing Co. ,250 the issue was
whether an employer could prohibit the attaching of personal air sam-
pling devices to its employees. The relevant agency regulation autho-
rizes OSHA officers "to take environmental samples" and "to employ
reasonable investigative techniques" in making their inspections. 25'
The regulations fail, however, to define what is a "reasonable investiga-
tive technique." Only in OSHA's Field Operations Manual are per-
sonal sampling devices expressly mentioned and approved.
The district court, relying on a Ninth Circuit decision,252 held that
the employer was not required to have attached to its employees per-
sonal sampling devices, at least in the absence of a statute or regulation
which expressly declares that these devices are reasonable. The major-
ity, with Judge Swygert dissenting, affirmed but not on the ground that
personal sampling devices were not a "reasonable investigative tech-
nique." Rather, the court held that the employer was not given "fair
warning" of what is required or prohibited by the regulation. More
specifically, "nowhere in the applicable regulations is the use of per-
sonal sampling devices identified as a 'reasonable' investigative tech-
nique. ' 253  The Secretary had every opportunity to clarify the
regulation to conform to OSHA's long held interpretation and practice
and to remedy the consequences of the Ninth Circuit decision. Having
failed to do so, civil contempt sanctions could not be imposed.
In a case heard the same day as Metro-East and decided eleven
days later, Kropp Forge Co. v. Secretary of Labor,25 4 the court ad-
dressed a similar vagueness problem. An OSHA regulation provided
that a "continuing effective hearing conservation program" is to be ad-
ministered in areas of excessive noise. 255 The employer in the case was
charged with violating this regulation and assessed a monetary penalty
after the ALJ found that the violation was "willful-serious." Specifi-
cally, the ALJ found that the employer's hearing conservation program
lacked six necessary elements. The court, now including Judge
Swygert, overturned this administrative decision on the ground that the
regulation was unenforceably vague.
The court held that the regulation failed to give fair warning to
employers that these six specific elements must be satisfied. In fact,
250. 655 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1981).
251. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.7(b) (1982).
252. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979), aft'g, 452 F. Supp. 575
(D. Mont. 1978).
253. 655 F.2d at 811.
254. 657 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1981).
255. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(3) (1980).
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various past actions on the part of OSHA indicated that several of these
elements were not considered mandatory.256 Additionally, after the ad-
ministrative decision in this case, the regulation in question was with-
drawn and replaced with one that expressly listed the six elements.257
The court interpreted this action as "acknowledging that these elements
were not previously included in the standard before us." 258 The court
also noted that the regulation was found unenforceably vague in two
previous decisions by ALJs, the first as early as 1976.259 As in Metro-
East, the court stressed the fact that the Secretary had been alerted to
the regulation's vagueness problems and had ample opportunity to cure
them but failed to do so. The burden must rest with the Secretary to
promulgate regulations that are clear and specific with respect to scope,
coverage and requirements.
Attorney's Fees
One of the remedies available to an aggrieved plaintiff under Title
VII is an award of reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs. 260 In
recent years, litigation over the reasonableness of fees has often over-
shadowed the merits of employment actions. A perfect illustration is
the court's decision in Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc. 261
In Chrapliwy, the issue before the court was whether time ex-
pended by plaintiffs' counsel in a proceeding under Executive Order
11246 seeking debarment of the defendant from federal contracts, 262 a
proceeding in which plaintiffs were not parties, is compensable where
the effort expended by plaintiffs' counsel in the administrative proceed-
ing directly contributed to and was primarily responsible for the settle-
ment of the related Title VII action. The district court concluded that
such time is not compensable based upon the language of § 706(k) of
Title VI1 263 and the Supreme Court's decision in New York Gaslight
Club, Inc. v. Carey.264 It reasoned that New York Gaslight Club was
256. 657 F.2d at 122-23.
257. Id at 123, citing 46 Fed. Reg. 4162-64 (1981).
258. Id
259. Id
260. Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), provides:
In any action or proceeding under [Title VII] the court ... may allow the prevail-
ing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ...
261. 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. May 19, 1982).
262. Executive Order 11246 prohibits discrimination against employees by federal contractors.
One sanction which can be imposed is debarment from existing contracts and ineligibility for
future contracts.
263. See supra note 260.
264. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
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limited to time spent on proceedings mandated by Title VII. The ad-
ministrative proceeding here, while admittedly successful, was not
mandated by Title VII. The Seventh Circuit declined to give New York
Gaslight Club such a narrow reading. It believed Title VII's attorney's
fee provision should be liberally construed, especially here where the
district court had earlier approved and encouraged the plaintiffs' ad-
ministrative efforts and where there was no dispute that the administra-
tive efforts brought about a successful conclusion to the Title VII
litigation. This same reasoning was also used to overturn the district
court's narrow interpretation of § 706(k). Liberal construction was the
theme of the court's decision in Chrapliwy.
The implications of the Chrapliwy decision are frightening to em-
ployers and an enormous benefit to Title VII plaintiffs. How far does
Chrapliwy extend? The court stressed the fact that the plaintiffs' ad-
ministrative efforts were successful and directly responsible for the Ti-
tle VII victory. Would fees for that time be appropriate had the
plaintiffs not prevailed in the administrative proceeding or where the
administrative victory was shown to be inconsequential to the Title VII
victory? How far beyond the forums expressly provided for in Title
VII may a plaintiff go in seeking a favorable resolution of an employ-
ment discrimination claim? And will attorney's fees always be appro-
priate for time expended in those forums? 265 These are some of the
issues left unanswered by Chrapliwy.
The second important holding of Chrapliwy concerns reasonable
billing rates. The district court had limited plaintiffs' out-of-town
counsels' billing rates to those prevailing in the local community of the
district court. The Seventh Circuit held that this limitation would only
be proper where "there is reason to believe that services of equal quali-
ty were readily available at a lower charge or rate in the area where the
services were to be rendered. ' 266 It then concluded that the extreme
complexity of the litigation justified plaintiffs' efforts to seek expert
counsel from any geographical region, without counsel being forced to
accept a reduction in his otherwise normal and reasonable billing rate.
Another important fact was the defendant's retention of expensive,
highly respected out-of-town counsel. This legitimized the plaintiffs'
need to seek the most able counsel available from any geographical
area.
267
265. See Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1716 (1982) (time spent on arbitration proceeding compensable).
266. 670 F.2d at 769.
267. In Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the Court of Appeals for the
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In Bugg v. International Union of Allied Industrial Workers, 268 the
prevailing defendant-appellee was granted attorney's fees for time
spent on the appeal of the action. The court believed that the congres-
sional intention of protecting defendants from burdensome litigation
having no legal or factual basis, discussed in Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC,2 6 9 is just as applicable to defendants in the appeal stage
as it is in the trial stage. Such an award is available, however, only
where plaintiff's appeal is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.' '270 The court
added that "[a]lthough a district court's determination that the plain-
tiff's original action was frivolous or meritless may be probative of the
efficacy of the appeal, such a determination is neither necessary nor
sufficient to support an appellate award. ' '27'
Another issue arising from New York Gaslight Club was addressed
by the court in Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp. ;272 whether plaintiff's
counsel is entitled to recover attorney's fees for time expended during
unsuccessful state proceedings. The court held there was such an enti-
tlement based primarily upon a passage from the New York Gaslight
Club opinion wherein the Supreme Court stated it would be "anoma-
lous" not to award fees for time spent in unsuccessful or only partially
successful proceedings.273 Ultimate success in the federal action is now
the only requirement for the recovery of fees for state proceedings.
One last Title VII attorney's fee case merits mention. In Stewart v.
Hannon,274 the plaintiffs brought a suit challenging an examination
given to prospective assistant school principals. The district court dis-
missed the case but, while on appeal, the defendants ended use of the
exam. The plaintiffs then petitioned the district court for attorney's
fees which were denied for the reason that they were not prevailing
parties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision on the basis that
there was "sufficient evidence in the record to support the district
court's findings and the district court's finding that the plaintiffs were
not prevailing parties is not clearly erroneous. ' 275 The standard gov-
District of Columbia reached an opposite result, holding that the relevant community is the one in
which the district court sits.
268. 674 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1982).
269. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
270. 674 F.2d at 600 (footnote omitted).
271. Id n.10.
272. 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2288
(1982).
273. 657 F.2d at 920, citing 447 U.S. at 66.
274. 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982).
275. Id at 852.
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erning whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party in the "practical sense"
was set forth in Dawson v. Pastrick,276 and the court's discussion of
those standards to the facts before it is valuable.
Union Elections
Two decisions were rendered this term in cases involving actions
brought by the Secretary of Labor alleging violations of the election
rules of Title IV of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.277 In Marshall v. Local 1010, United Steelworkers,278 the
incumbent faction decided that only one voting booth would be present
at each voting site, knowing this to be totally inadequate and resulting
in members voting openly on tables. Furthermore, the incumbent fac-
tion knew that a secret ballot was required under federal law. On the
day of the election, it became apparent that the challenger for the high-
est office would be victorious. He was assured, however, by high offi-
cials of the incumbent faction that he would never take office. After
the election was concluded, officials of the incumbent again violated
federal law by ordering the burning of unused ballots. The challenger
won the election by a 2-1 margin but protests to the election were filed
by the incumbent union which were rejected by internal union
tribunals.
The district court concluded that the absence of a secret ballot
could not have affected the outcome of the election primarily on the
basis that the challenging faction had won the election in a landslide.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the secrecy requirement
is not intended only for the benefit of the challenger.279 The appellate
court declined to fashion a per se rule that secrecy violations always
"may have affected" an election outcome but held that the union was
unable in this instance to rebut the prima facie showing of a violation
made by the Secretary. Despite a finding of a violation, the court
agreed with the alternative holding of the district court that a rerun
election was not required in these circumstances. Finding a suit under
LMRDA to be essentially an equitable proceeding, 280 the court held
that "where, as here, the incumbent faction was responsible for the in-
tentional and blatant violations which occurred, and threatened to and
276. 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., Inc., 665
F.2d 149, 162-65 (7th Cir. 1981).
277. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
278. 664 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1981).
279. Id. at 148.
280. Id. at 149. Accord, Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1980); Usery v. Interna-
tional Org. of Masters, Mates and Pilots, 538 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1976).
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has attempted to use these violations as a basis of unseating their chal-
lengers, the district court has the inherent equitable power to consider
these facts and to mold the decree to fit the facts. ' 281 Ordering a rerun
election would have had the perverse result of encouraging and re-
warding deliberate violations of the federal laws. While finding no
need for a rerun election in this case, the court noted that such a result
will be "rare. '282
In Donovan v. Illinois Education Association ,283 the court examined
the sensitive issue of racial and ethnic restrictions in union by-laws
governing the election of officers. The union leadership in that case
was made up of a 600 member assembly and a fifty member Board of
Directors. In 1974, the union's by-laws were amended in two ways.
First, members of four minority groups were guaranteed 8% of assem-
bly membership. If that level was not reached by the ordinary electoral
process, the Board of Directors was directed to enlarge the total
number in the assembly as necessary and appoint minority members to
the level where 8% of the total body was comprised of minority mem-
bers. Second, the size of the Board of Directors was increased to fifty-
four with the four additional seats reserved for minority members.
These four seats were in addition to those held by minority members
through the normal election process. The Secretary filed challenges
against these provisions which were rejected by the district court.
The court, through Judge Posner, emphasized at the beginning of
its analysis that the case did not involve the legality of affirmative ac-
tion. This was a case brought under the LMRDA and not under any
civil rights statute or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. There was also no evidence suggesting that the union had
engaged in any discriminatory conduct in the past which the by-laws
were intended to overcome. Thus, the standards applied by the court
were the same standards applied in any other case involving provisions
affecting union elections.
The court initially recognized the obvious effect of the by-laws: a
limitation on members' eligibility for office and the right to vote for
candidates of one's choice. Assuming that the vast majority of union
members are white, the effect of the by-laws was to preclude a majority
of the members from running for election to the seats in the Assembly
and appointed to Board seats reserved for minority members. While 29
281. Id at 152.
282. Id at 151.
283. 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
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U.S.C. § 48 1(e) allows "reasonable qualifications" to be placed on can-
didacy,284 the court could not find any case where a qualification which
excluded a majority of the membership was found reasonable. 28 5 The
court also noted the danger created by the by-laws of perpetuating the
strength of the incumbent union. The Board of Directors was empow-
ered to appoint additional minority members to the Assembly, the
same body that elects members of the Board. Such a danger posed a
threat to democratic values. 286
Despite these problems with the by-laws, the court refused to con-
clude that no set of facts could justify the restrictions. 28 7 No evidence
was presented by the union showing its racial and ethnic composition
and how the by-laws helped promote greater and more equal represen-
tation for the selected minority groups. The by-laws also failed to treat
each minority group separately. Rather, the four groups were all
lumped together for purposes of the by-laws. For instance, the four
additional Directors could all be Asian. This would not, however, nec-
essarily remedy the underrepresentation of the other minority groups
which was the probable aim of the by-laws. For all these reasons, the
court concluded that the racial and ethnic restrictions were invalid.
Constitutional Law
Two cases this term presented difficult issues regarding the power
of a police force and a school board to limit the first amendment rights
of its employees. Each centered upon the scope of the abridgement and
the nature of the state interests being asserted as justification.
The police force case, Mescall v. Rochford,288 centered upon a rule
of the Chicago Police Department which prohibited officers from being
members of any union whose membership was not exclusively limited
to full time law enforcement officers. The rule did not apply to an
officer's secondary employment. The need or interest asserted by the
Department was that police officers must appear to be impartial and
neutral in the handling of labor disputes. The appellate court adopted
the district court's opinion which held that the Department had "cho-
284. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a reason-
able opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every member in
good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate to hold office (subject to. . .reasonable
qualifications uniformly imposed). ...
285. 667 F.2d at 641.
286. Id
287. Id at 641.
288. 655 F.2d Ill (7th Cir. 1981).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
sen an arbitrary, irrational and impermissibly overbroad method of in-
suring" impartiality and neutrality. 289 Two aspects of the rule were
particularly troublesome. The first was that portion of the rule which
imposed no limitations on union membership for an officer's secondary
employment. The same type of conflict of interest problem sought to
be eliminated by the rule was being created by its exception. The sec-
ond aspect was that the rule permitted officers to join civic, fraternal,
ethnic and patriotic organizations. The court noted that, here too,
"dual allegiance" problems might arise which run contrary to the pri-
mary purpose of the rule.290 In sum, the court concluded that the De-
partment acted unreasonably and arbitrarily in selecting this rather
narrow area to preserve and enforce neutrality.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Cudahy correctly emphasized
other first amendment deficiencies with the rule.291 The overbreadth of
the rule is evident in that it precludes an all-police local from affiliating
with a national or international. The possibility of conflict is not suffi-
ciently present in that instance to justify abridgement. Further, the rule
bans membership in all unions with non-police members, even those
whose non-police members assert no right to strike. Here again, the
possibility of conflict is greatly lessened insasmuch as the officer will
not likely be called upon to cross a picket line.
The first amendment school board case is Perry Local Educators'
Association v. Hohlt.292 The issue there was the constitutionality of a
collective bargaining agreement between a teacher's union and a school
board that permitted the incumbent union to use the school district's
internal mail system but compelled the school district to deny that right
to competing unions. The agreement did not prohibit the use of the
system to any other person or organization. Applying a "rigorous scru-
tiny" standard of review,293 the court, disagreeing with several
others, 294 found the agreement to be in violation of the first
amendment.
The school district asserted two state interests behind the rule.
The first was that it assisted the incumbent in fulfilling its legal duties
to the teachers with respect to bargaining and contract administration.
The second was that it was necessary to ensure "labor peace" in the
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school system. The court found the first justification to be both overin-
clusive and underinclusive in that it did not restrict the incumbent to
use of the system only for that purpose but permitted other persons or
organizations, who owed no special duties to the teachers, to use the
system.295 The school district could not adequately justify giving the
incumbent the exclusive right to use. With respect to the labor peace
justification, there was simply nothing to support the school district's
contention that more open access might incite work stoppages or create
hostility among employees. 296 The court found that the provision fa-
vored the majority union, so that "teachers inevitably will receive from
[the majority union] self-laudatory descriptions of its activities on their
behalf and will be denied the critical perspective offered by the [minor-
ity union]. ' 297 Finding the degree of abridgement substantial and the
state interests unachievable by the exclusivity rule, the court reversed
the district court and found the rule to be unconstitutional. 298
CONCLUSION
The 1981-82 term of the Seventh Circuit was marked by an unusu-
ally large number of significant decisions. This is best evidenced by the
number of issues addressed by the court which have reached the docket
of the Supreme Court. The Wright Line "dual motive" analysis, the
prima facie showing required under Title VII, the obligations of a
union steward during an illegal work stoppage, the first amendment
implications of public sector collective bargaining agreements contain-
ing provisions favoring the incumbent union, and the constitutionality
of the state and local government provision of the ADEA will all be
subjects of Supreme Court review during the next year.
One other characteristic stands out from the past term. Just as the
Supreme Court has experienced a major increase in workload and
docket, so has the Seventh Circuit, especially in labor and employment
law. The impact of this development requires careful monitoring to
ensure that scholarship excellence will be maintained despite the enor-
mous strain placed on the court.
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